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Abstract
This sudy examines the persuasive nature ofBritish propaganda in the United States
between the years of1939 and 1941. Radio scripts, serialized publications and pamphlas
poduced for distribution during this period are examined for the use ofBurke's ( 1969) concept
ofidentification and their ability to meet to the standards ofFisher's (19E9) logic of good
reasons. The study concludes that British propaganda made extensive use of identification and
meets the standards ofthe logic of good reasons. The study also identifies three phases of British
propaganda in which slightly different persuasive approaches arc used.
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Chapter I: Purpose and Background
Purmse
This study will examine Great Britain's effons to gain American sympathy, support, and
assistance in its war efrort through the use of propaganda This analysis will be carried out by
appllng Burke's concept of identification and Fisher's logic ofgood reasons to materials
prodrrced by Great Britain for distribrrion in America between the years of 1939 and 1941.
Back$ound
Introduction. Shortly after the United States entered the Second World War, British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave an international radio address in which he referred to the
United States' entry into the war. Churchill proclaimed, "this is a moment we have dreamed of,
aimed at and worked for" (Cull, 195, p. 3). Churchill's words alarmed the British Embassy in
Washington, D.C., that feared the use of the words "worked for" would give Americans the "idea
that a simple innocent people had been caught asleep by others cleverer than tlrcmselves" (p. 3).
Churchill's statement was perfectly truthful. In the years leading up to U.S. enty into the
war, Britain had worked tirelessly to gain U.S. sympathy, supporg and assistance. Central to
these efforts would be an ongoing and evolving propaganda campaign that would make use of
film, literature, radio and news to project a "people's war." The people's war emphasized
themes of dernocracy, freedom, class equality, Christianity, individual and collective bravery and
daermination (Brcwa, 1997;Calder, l9l; Cull, 1993, 195, 1997 ;Tat1lor, 1990).
British propaganda would not only play a pivotal role in drawing America into the
Second World War (Brewer, 197; Cull, 195), but it rryould also be pivoal influencing Aitglo-
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American relations following the war (Brewer, 1997). Yet despite the significancc of its role,
British propaganda would rcceive littlc serious attention from historians.
As early as 1937, with hostilities in Europe escalating and the threat ofwar growing
Great Britain realized it would not survive a prolonged war effort without American assistance
(Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 198/5,1997). Howevcr, several hctors would prevent Britain from
making a direct appeal to the United Statcs for assistance. British propagandists would face an
America firmly entenched in an isolationist mindset that was rcinforred by stict new Neutrality
Acts. Additionally, American indifference or even negativity toward Britain, along with the
legacy of Britain's propaganda tactics during the First World War would further complicate and
impede efforts on Britain's behalfto build "a spccial relationship" (Brewer, p. 5, 1997). These
factors would influence and at times govem British propaganda in the U.S. between 1939 and
t941.
British hopasanda in w.w.I. British propagandists of the Second world war were
forced to deal with the legacy of their own efforts in the U.S. during the First World War'
Betw,een the years of 1914 and 1917, Britain engaged in an exensive and organized propaganda
campaign designed to draw America into the war (Saunden & Taylor, 1982). The British
propaganda campaign of world war I proved to be highly successful; this success, however, was
achievcd primarily through dece6ion.
Recognizing that the U.S. would dislike any attcmpt to manipulate public opinion, the
British campaign took great care to ensurE rhrr propaganda nwer appearcd to emanate from any
official British source. This covert effort was aided by the fact thar, early in the war, Britain had
*cut the direct subtenancan cables linking Germany with the United States" (Taylor, 1990, p.
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163) allowing Britain almost complete connol of European news entcring the United Sates
(Brerver, 1997; Cull, 1995; Saunders & Taylor, l9E2; Taylor, 1990).
Throughout WW[ th€ British d€picted the war as a battle between civilization and
barbarism (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995; Peterson, 1939; Squires, 1935; Saunders & Taylor, 1982;
Taylor, 1981, 1990), News centcred upon the sensational and featured "images ofbloated
Prussian ogres" and "beastly Huns viotating women, mutilating children, desecrating and looting
chnrches" (Taylor, 1990, p. 166). The Reprt on the Committee of Alleged Gennan Atrocities in
Betgiun, otlwwise known as The Bryce Report, went so far as to proclaim that German
activities represented 'tuurder, lust and pillage on a scale unporalleled in any war between
civilized nations in the last three centuries" (Brewer, 1997,p. l4).
Atocity stories, normally at leas partially fabricate4 proved to a be powerful tool in
Britain's quest to cap$re the American conscience (Cull, 1995; Taylor, 1980, 190)' olte such
example carne in early l9l7 when the British press began reporting tales ofa "Corpse-
Conversion Factory" (Taylor, 1990, p. 166) in which the Germans melted human corpses to
produce soap. Despite ttre fact that the British Foreigr Office knew the story to be untrue, they
still promoted it as facs (Taylor, 1990).
Germany's very real p,ropaganda blunders and violarions of intemational law also served
to reinforce the image ofbarbarism set forth by Britain. The sinking ofthe passenger liner,
Lusitania in 1915, resulting in the deaths ofthousands of innocem passengers, provided Briain
with some credibility in their portrayal of German savageness. The image was rcinforced a year
later when a gold medallion commernorating the sinking of the Lusitania uas crcated. Pictures
ofthe medallion quickly made their nay from Germany to ne\rspapers throughout Britain and
the United States (Taylor, 190).
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While it would be impossible to ascerain the precise extent that British propaganda
played in drawing the United States into the First World War, it did play a compelling role in
stining the American conscicnce (Taylor, 1990). Following the war, revelations thar atocity
stories had been fabricated left many Americans feeling manipulated (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995;
Taylor, 1990). Brewer (197) contends that the British propaganda of the Fint World War
affected the U.S. percepion of the war and did not manipulate American behavior. However,
the oveniding belief of Americans that they had indeed been manipulated (Cull, 1995) uas
enough to create "a legacy of suspicion" (Brewer, 1997 , p. 22) and helped to foster a sense of
Anglophobia (Cull, 1995). Perhaps most importantly, the feeling of having been duped into
participating in the war helped to.yustiff the subsequent move to isolationism in the United States
(Cull, 1995).
The Neutrality Acts and Isolationism. In 1935 America enacted a s€t of Neutrality Acts
that woul4 in 1936, be amanded to prevent all trade with belligerem powers (Brer) ar, 197;
Cutl, 1995; Reynolds, 1983). These acts remained in place until November 1939 when, as the
"first reward for British prudence" (Cull, 195, p. 6l), they werc revised. The rcvised Neutrality
Acts allowed belligerent porvers to place orden for war materials but requiled thA they "make
full cash payment and take title before the goods left America" (Kennedy, 199' p. 434). The
"cash and carry" stipulation was indicarive of the continued sfiength of isoluionists in the House
of Reprcsentatives and a sign that tlre revision of the Acts was still far from interventionism
(Cull, 195; Kennedy, 1999).
Britain was bound to the cash and carry stiprlation ofthe Neutrality Acts until Septernber
2, 1940 when president Franklin Roosevelt signed an execdive order authorizing the destroyen-
for-bases deal (Kennedy, 1999). This deal, prcsented as I means ofincreasing US security,
4
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provided for the transfer of50 naval destroyers in exchange for the deeds to British naval bases
in Newfoundlan4 Bermrda and the West Indies (Kennedy, 1999).
Britain's final srcp short of U.S. enry in the war in overcoming the nerlrality laws came
in the form of the lendlease bill. LendJease permitted the "transfer of munitions and supplies
for which Congress had appropiated mon€ry to the govemment ofany country whose defense the
President deerns vital to the defense of the United States" (Goodwin, 194, p. 210). The bill did
not poss until after much of Britain's remaining u.s. investtrents had been publicly sold or
liquidated (Kennedy, 1999). Like the destroyers-for-bases agreement, lendJease was not
without isolationist constraints. One clause ofthe bill stipulated that nothing contained in the
Act should be seen as "authorization of convoying vessels ofnaval vessels ofthe United States"
(Kennedy, 1999, P. 47 4).
The pervasive isolationist mindset ofthe United States was just as, if not more, serious an
obstacle to Britain's efforts in the US as the legalities of the Neutrality Acts' In a 1937 memo,
Britain's U.S. Ambassador Sir Robert Lindsay sarcd, " isolationism has pervaded every thought
and taken complete possession of wery American mind in every field" (Hachey, l97l-72,p.72).
"This dynamic impulse to rcrnain aloof from European politics" (Cull, 1995, p. 6) would remain
a constant barrier to Britain's success in lhc United States. Any action perceived as an atemp to
reverse isolationism threarcned to further entrench it; however, given the urgency of their
situation Britain could ill afford not to act.
Britain faced not only a prevailing isolationist mentality, but an exuemely active
isolationist movement as well. In the years preceding American entry into the Second World
War, isolationist organizations were formed on local and national levels. Among the many
isolationist organizations in the U. S. were the Keep Amoica Out of War Congress, The Yanks
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are Not Coming Committoe, and tlr Women's lrague of Peace, Freedom and Fellowship
(Reynotds, 1982). By far the largest and most prourinem of the isolationis groups was America
First, founded in September 1940 (Cole, 1983). The America First Committ€e gained support
from a number of prominent Americans including aviation hero Charles Lindbergh, along with
dozens of United States Senators and Congressman (bvine, 1940; Reynolds, l9E3).
Although the tone and methods of isolationists often ditrere4 isolationist arguments
typically centered on s€veral points. First, isolationiss claimcd that American rms safe from the
events in Europe and had no reason or responsibility to become involved in the war (Brumback,
l94l;Cole, 1953,1974;Howe, 1937;Sargent, l94l;Srcnehjem, 1976). Isolationistsalso
pointed to the fact that U.S. involvernent in the war could result in the deaths of Americans and
pose a threat to American interests (Brumbaclq I 94 I ; Page, I 939). Similarly, isolationists
cautioned that U.S. democracy would be threatened by U.S. participation in the war (Cole, 1953,
1974). Isolationiss also argued that support or involvemert in the war was a contradiction of
American Christian values (Brumback, 1941; Page, 1939; Sargent, l94l).
Other isolationist argurnenB were directed more specifically at Great Britain. Father
Charles Coughlin, a popular radio evangplist, regularly targcted Britain in his broadcasts and
weekly publication. For example, Coughtin regularly ran an advertisement in his newsletter that
contended that Americans, not the British had won Britain's last war. The advertisernent
claimed this fact was evidcnt by the number of American soldiers who were been killed or
wounded in the First World War (Lavine, 1940). Coughlin's claim was common of the
isolationist rhetoric that suggested Briain rras a weak classist socicty that rms unable to defend
itself and that it "did not have the slightest concepiotr of democracy" (p. I l9).
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The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration Countering tlrc isolationist claims were
American interventionists. Brewer (1997) argues that "the most importsnt figure on the
internationalist-interventionist side was President Roosevelf' (p. 339). The British Foreign
Oflice and Ministry of Information (MoI) werc au/are that while American Neutrality Acts and
isolalionism greatly resricted him, US President Franklin Roosevelt was sympathetic to the
British war effort (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995,1997; Goodwin, 1994; Kennedy, 1999). As
early as l93E Roosevelt had ensured Prime Minister Chamberlain that, in the event of hostilities,
Britain would have full US support (Kennedy, 1999).
In the surnmer of 1939, Roosevelt was "eager to boost British stock" (Cull, 1995,p.23)
and helped to deliver them their first propaganda success. Roosevelt extended an invitation to
King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to visit the New York World's Fair. The President fiuther
suggested the royal couple should "enjoy tfuree or four days of very simple country life" (Cull,
197, p. 335) at Roosevelt's home in Hyde Park, New York. The royal visit to Hyde Parh
complete with a picnic ofhot dogs and beer, helped to "put a human face" (p. 335) on the King.
The visit ultimately found The New York Times prxlaiming George M "the people's King"
(Cull, 1995, p. 28).
Roosevelt's efforts on behalfofthe British continued throughout the early years ofthe
Second World War. Despite the rcstrictions placed upon him by both public opinion and law,
Roosevelt pushed for a revision of the Neutrality Acts in favor of Great BriAin (Cole, l9E3).
The President also sigled ar Executive orrder approving the destroyers-for-bases deal' despite
the fact that such action could have led to impeachrent (Kennedy' 1999).
The sup,port ofRoosevelt and his a&ninistration aclually served to place fifither
constraints on British propagandists. Recogrizing Roosevelt's potential for securing U.S.
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assistance, the Forcign offrcc cautioned propagandists not to do anything that might disrupt
Roosevelt's bid for reelection" (Cull, 1995, p. 65) as the Presidert sought an unprecedented third
term as pnesident
Phases of British Propaeanda
This combination of factors prevented Britain from making an overt effort to win the
sympathy, suppor! end assistance oftheir U.S. audience. The British propaganda campaign in
the U.S., as depicted in Cull's (1995) SellinglVar: The British Propaganda Campaign Against
American Neutrality in World llar II, suggests that tlrc campaign went through several phases.
with each phase, both the tone and desired goal of the propagBnda chand. For the purposes of
this snrdy, British propaganda will be considered in relation to tk€e phases that are briefly
described below
Phase I: Intoducine Great BriAin (March 1939 to tvlav 1940). At this stag€, BriAin was
particularly mindful of its past propaganda misAkes and American isolationism. Fearing
backlash from an overt or aggrcssive campaign, Britain rclied upon a policy of "no proWandd'
@rewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995). The "no propaganda" rule was fust implernented in 1924
when the Foreigr Offrce ordercd that British policy in the United States nas'to tell the tnrth"
(Cull, 1995, p. l0). ' 'No propaganda' would in ibelf be a propaganda gambif'(N.J. Cull,
personal communication, November 13, 2000). Although Britain would enact a "strategy of
truth" (Brewer, 1997, p. 4) it would be "entirely wrong to think of it as no propaganda but rather
as a self denying ordinarrce" (N.J. Cull, personal communicatiorl November 13, 2000). This
shategy of tnrth at least in p6rt, helped Britain to live down the legacy of The First \ilorld War.
In the months leading to Britain's September 3, 1939, declaration of War on Germany,
Britain began to take steps to cuttivate a "special relationship" (Breurcr, 1997, p. 5) with the
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United States. The lirst ofthese stcps came in the form of Erira in To-Day, a$icc-monthly
publication produced by the British Council and distribued by the British Library ofNew York
(BLINY). The second canre in the form of the British Pavilion at thc World's Fair in New York
and the accompanying royal visit that June.
For the most par! however, Britain chose to rely upon news brcadcasts, particularly those
of Eduard R. Munow, to convey the events of the war to the American public (Brewer, 1997).
Britain had hoped that the power of the events would make a compelling case for them (Cull,
1995). Howwer, ttre relative calm that followed the declaration of war, a period known as "the
phony war"' (Goodwin, 199,4, p.l4), would help foster the idea that Britain was dormant (Brewer'
1997). That impression aside, Briain's "prudence" (Cull, 1995, p. 61) was reward€d with the
revision of the Neutrality Acts.
Phase II: Britain Takes It and Caries orr (Mav 1940 to December l9't0). In May 1940
Germany invaded Hollan4 Lrxembourg; Belgium, and France, puning an end to the "photty
war.,, Although Britain faced sevcral morc months of inactivity before the Battle of Britain, a
series of air battles between Germany and BriAin began in August 1940. The Battle of Britain
resulted in Germany's first sigrificant loss ofthe nar (Goodwin, 1994; Kennedy, 1999).
As thc events of the urar progressed, so too did British propaganda in the U.S. Briain
began to st€ss themes of democracy, freedom, class equality, irdividul and colletive bovery,
heroism, and determination @rewer, 1997:-Cd&r,1991; Cull, 1993,195,1997; Taylor, 1990).
These themes become unified to produce 'The People's War," a concep designed to confadict
some of the neptive attitudes held by Americans towards Britain through narratives stressing the
role of individruls in the nar effort.
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The projection of the People's War was aided by the introduction of the BBC's North
American Service. In addition to news and music programming the BBC North American
Sewice began ai fing Brttain Sryaks in May 1940. Britain Speaks, written and delivered by
playuright J.B. Priestley, was homage to the elernents central to the people's war.
Additionally, the Ministry of Information (MoI) Film Division, Crown Films, began
producing and distributing documentaries and feature length films on both sides ofthe Atlantic.
The Mol efforts first mat€rialized in American theoters with Humphrey Jennings' The First
Days, a film designed to present the peopl€'s war and appeal to "the d€mocratically minded
American audience" (Cull, 1995, p. 47).
On September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed an executive order providing Britain
50 much-needed destroyers in exchange for the deeds to naval bases in Newfoundland and
Bermuda and the West Indies (Kennedy, 1999).
On September 7, 1940, the much anticipated Blitzlsieg hCBn. For 59 nights German
bombers attacked L,ondon 'without mercy" (Cull, 1995, p.97). The BliU captured American
symporhy at new lwels (Calder, l99l; Cull, 1995,1997). America found something to hate in
Hitler and something to love in Britain (Cull, 195). Moreover, the BliU provided Briain the
oppornmity to dononsfarc its stength and courage to Americans and demonstrate that they were
a good investnent for those who might have thought them a lost cause.
The horror of the Blie was relayed to Americans by the broadcasts of Edward R. Munow
and other Amcrican correspondems along with Priestley's weekly b;llrs on Britain Speaks. The
BBC North American Sewicc increased both its programming and its audience in the United
Sates by inroducing a broad range of programmlng inaludingChildren Calling Home,
Answering You and llthen Stones Cry (Briggs, I 979). Meanwhile, the Crovm Film Unit
l0
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continued exporting films and documentaries to the U.S., most significantly, Jennings' London
Can Take h thrr. documented the Blitz This period saw Briain rewarded with the passage of the
lendJease Bill allowing them the most significant U. S. aid to that point in the War (Cull, I 995 ;
Kennedy, 1999).
Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December l94l). Britain began its final and
most overt campaigr for American assistance. Briain now openly requested and urged American
ai{ though hopes for U.S. enry in the War remsined unspoken (Cull, 1995). As l94l
pogress€{ Briain saw the payofrto its efrorts in an America that seemed ready to embrace war.
Popular culture, from comic books and cartoons to best selling novels, reflected the shift to
interventionism. Comic book hroes began battling Nazi villains while accounts of the War from
Britain topped the U.S. best sellen list (Cull, 1995). The BBC inu;odtrced Fronline Family,tlrcir
first serial, to American audiences via the North American Service. The progruD, dcpicting the
lives of "people like ourselves but.. . facing the most terrible calauity that can befall the human
racB" (Colley & Colley, l94l) would become a bona fde hit in the Unitcd States (Cull, 1993,
l995).
In December l94l the United States entered the war following the Japanese bombing of
Pearl Harbor. Givcn the fact thst the United States did nd eoEr the war until after the Japanese
attack and Germaoy's declaration of war, some might dismiss the significance of Britain's
propaganda efforts in tre United Stat€s. Howwer, as Cull (195) poinb ou! the Japanese
attack and German doclaration ofwar w€re not made against "a sleeping gian! but a nation
politically and industrially 
- 
if not quite miliarily 
- 
pepared for nat'' (p. 201). Moreover, it was
a nation that had seen the war through the eyes ofthe Britistr and based many of its decisions on
those images.
ll
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Summary
Between the years of 1939 and l94l Great Britain souglrt to erode the pervasive
isolationist mindset of the United States in order to gpin America's sympothy, support, and
assistance in its war effort. ln order to achieve these goals, Britain would rely on a propaganda
campaign centered on The People's War. This campaigr would make usc of film, radio, and
printed materials to bring about a gadual change in American opinion toward both Britain and
the war.
Despite the important role British propaganda in the United States played in the Second
World War and Anglo-American relations, it has been th€ subject of a relatively limited amount
ofliterature. These strdies, along with an overview ofgeneral propoganda str.rdies, will be
oomined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will provide the rationale and an explanation of the method of
this snrdy. Chaper 4 will apply Burke's notion of idertification. The frct, consistficy and
transcerdent issue dimensions ofFisher's logic of good reasons will be discussed in Chap6r 5
with the remaining dimorsions, consistency and consequences examirrcd in Chapter 6. Finally,
Chapter 7 will consider the Gsults of this study.
t2
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Chapter [: Literature Review
Penpec'tives on Propaganda
Hummel and Huntress (1949) stare that' 'Propaganda' is a word of evil connotation" (p.
I ). While this satement does not offer a definition or provide an undershnding of propaganda, it
does provide a clear indication ofthe negative views associated with propaganda. This view is
confirmed by Drescher (1987) who notes that propaganda has come to be s€en as what Cranston
carcgorizes as a ''boo' ra,ther than 'hunah' word" (p. 88).
The two irrdeph stradies of British propaganda in the United States have defined
propaganda in rather general terms. Cull (1995) and Brewer (1997) define propaganda simply as
an organized form of mass persuasion. Brewer adds that her use of the term propaganda serves
to differentiate from the nsural *information" and the negative "disinformation." Cull also adds
that Britain's pers"asive efforts in the U.S. should be seen independently ofthe pejorative
connotations associared with propaganda.
Othen have attempted to provide more dweloped definitions of propaganda. O'Donnel
and Jowet ( 1989) suggest that propoganda is a "deliberate attemp to shape perceptions,
manipulate cognition, and direa behavior to achieve a response" (p. 53). Dmb (1935) defines
propaganda as'? systematic atiempt by an individual (or individuals) to control the attitudes of
groups of individuals through the use of suggestion an4 consequently, to control their action" (p.
99). Though not inaccurate, Doob's definition does address the beneficiary of gopaganda.
Taylor (1992) poins to the most recent NATO definition ofpropagan& which notes that
propaganda is *Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to inlluerrce the
opiniorL emotion, attitudes or behavior ofa specified group to banefit the sponsors"
I3
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O'Donnel and Jowett (1989) examine the distinctions among and uses of, the three types
of prropaganda commonly refened to as black, gray, and white by numercus prcpoganda studies.
Considerable atention is given to both black and gray propaganda. Black propaganda can best
be defined as being deceptive and credited to a false source. Gray propaganda may or may not
b€ cr€dited to its tue source and typically combines elements of the truth with decepion
(O'Donnel & JowEtt, l9E9). Indee4 the majority of snrdies concerned with propaganda during
wartime have focused on these forms of propaganda and their ability to elode enemy moral and
create confision and unrest. Such snrdies include Taylor's'?sycholory of Warfare Operations"
(1994),"Breaking the German Will to Resist" (1998). and Howe's (1988) The Black Game,to
name a ferv.
For the purposes of this sildy, British propaganda in the United SAtes during the Second
World War should be viewed as white propaganda The source of white propag8nda is not
concealed and is, for the most part, truthful. Whirc propaganda seeks to E€sent its views and
ideologies as the best. The honest approach of white propaganda allows for it to be viewed as
credible by its listeners (O'Donnel & Jowett, l9E9). I would suggest that, within the context of
this sMy, propaganda should be defined as aa orgenized attemp to shape the perceptions of an
audience in order to achieve a chalge in attitudes and behaviors through the use oftuth or
elernents ofthe tuth in order to benefit the sponsor.
Although the role of white propaganda during wartime has been largely overlooked,
several sudies are illuminating in understanding the role of this fom ofpropaganda.
Qualter (1952) examines the role of propgnda within democracies. He suggests propaganda in
democracies is morc difficult to direct effectively because it is presenrcd in a highly competitive
society and must overcome habits, prejudices, and irrational impulses. Subsequently, the
t4
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propagandist in a dernocracy has a greater challenge than one in a dictatorship who typically has
a morc compliant audience.
Additionally, both Hummel and Huntress (1949) and Lee and lre (1979) consider the
basic techniques and metho& frequently used by propagandists. This includes what Lee and Lee
describe as the seven most ftiequeffly uscd "ricks of the ra&" (p. 22), including name+alling.
glitrcring generalities, and testimonials. Hummel and Huntress (1949) discuss similar strategies
while also examining the nanre of the audierrce in the re+epion of propaganda.
British Prolnsanda in the United States
Literature dealing with Britain's use of propaganda in the Unitcd St*es during the
Second World War is limited. Both Rhodes (1976) and Taylor (1990) provide overviews of
Britain's use of propaganda in the U.S. as well as in Germany and on the home front. Both
describe the projcction ofthe People's War throucfi the use ofradio, film, and print materials and
assert their beliefthat these efforts helped to influence American foreign policy in Britain's
favor.
cull's (1995) mrdy, Se/Ilzg l{ar: The British Campaign Against American Neutrality,
provides the only attempt at a comp[Ehensive chronicle of Britain's efforS during the period
prior to the U.S. entry into th€ war. Cull suggssts that British propaganda in the U.S. went
through several stages with the both the tone ofthe propegarda and the nature of their requesb
changing with each phase.
Cull (1995) also esablishes dernocracy, freedom and Christianity as well as individual
and collective strengtll bravery and equality, as the cental thernes ofthe People's War. He
suggesb tbst thcse themes allowed for a change in American attitudes and influenced foreigr
policy that helped lead to U.S. participation in the Second World lVar.
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Brewer's (1997) To ll/in the Peace examines British propagan& throughout the Second
World War. While Brewer's focus is on the use of propaganda to promote Anglo-American
relations after the War, she docs confirm Cull's (195) assertion of the themes and imporhnce of
the People's War. Brewer also cites the importance ofBritrin's "sEarcgy oftruth" ( 1997, p. 34)
in establishing is credibility in the United States allowing for their claims to be accepted.
Several studics have examined specific frcas ofBritain's effor8 in the United States.
Cull ( 1993) chronicles the development of British broadcass in America" emphasizing several
points as having been essential to the success of Briain's broadcasts in the U.S. Cull claims that
the extensive cooperation offered to American correspondents, including Eduard R Munow and
Eric Sevareid by the BBC North American Liaison Unit, allowed the war experience to be
opened to American listeirers. Cull also describes the Americanization of British broadcasts
tluough the use of Canadian broadcasrcrs and American euphemisms.
Graves (1941) and Spence (19t2) agree with Cull's suggestion that Britain attempted to
Americanize its broadcasts to the U.S. Examining broadcasts of the period, ilrluding J.B.
Priestley's Erita in Spaks, Graves describes Briain's efforts as the "propaganda of opimism"
( I 94 1 , p. 40) thst focused upon tlreraes of "Chdstianity, civilization, freedom, hono/' and
'democracy" (p.42).
Calder ( l99l ) enamines Briain's effort to g€sent the Blitz to the United States. Again,
the use of American broadcasters and American euphemisms, such as the "lnndon Can Take lf'
slogan, are emphasized. Calder claims that the projection of the Blitz uas'a propagarda
constnrct adoFed because of its appeal to American opinion" (p. 212), and suggests that
coverage of the Blitz ircreased sytrpothy for Great Britain and support for Winston Churchill,
ultimately making America more recepive to Britain's appeals.
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The propaganda value ofthe British pavilion at the 1939 and 1940 World's Fairs and the
accompar,ying royal visit have been tlre subject oftwo studies. Both Cull (197) adRho&s
(1981) discuss the symbolism ofthe King and Queen picnicking with the Roosevelts and the
Flall of Democracy at the British pavilion as successful attempts to humsnize the royal couple
and Britain itself. Both suggest that these efrora did produce real but ultimately limited results
with the American people.
Sweral studies provide limited insight inm the fouo&tions of Britain's efforts in the
Unit€d States. Larson (1941) and Wilcox (19E3) describe the creation ofthe Ministry of
Infonnation (MoI), which oversaw British propaganda in the United StAes and in neutral and
allM nations, as well as home fiont propaganda. These studies povide confirmation of
Britain's need to proceed cautiously in the U.S. but serve more as studies oforganizational
culture than of propaganda
llachey Onl-72) offen Sir Robert Lindsay's observations on U.S. opinion and
suggSstions for a British approach. Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the U.S., stresses that
Britain needed to proceed with caution or face a serious backlash from American isolationists.
Lindsay warned thst arry att€mpb to win American support must bcar their "famous inferiority
complex... and touchincs" (p.122) in mind" Lindsay also attcmptedto iderri$those regions of
the US that would be most receptive to the British cause, adding "I don't believe tbat the Middle
West is capable of absorbing information about European politics" (p.126).
Studies of British Films as Prouonda
A number ofstudies have exanrined various aspects ofthe role ofBritish films during the
Second World lllar. AldFrc and Richards (199a), Coutlass (1989) and Ratigan (2001) have
examined the ability of British fi}ms and documeataries to promote the concep of the People's
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War in both the U.S. and Britain. Attention is also given to the ability of British films to
dramatize the sEength of the peoplc and illustrale the tk€at posed to Amoica by the Axis
pourcrs.
Other studies focused on individual themes of the People's War as depicted in British
film. For example, Coulass (l9EE) described the strength of the British pe{ple and their
willingness to sacrifice as shown in British films. Coutlass emphasized the ability of film to
present audiences with both the rcality and brutality of war in a manner that radio and print
media could not rival.
Stead (1988) emphasized the use ofthe English people in films and documentaries in an
effort to capture British life during the war on film. SEad (1988) paid particular attention to the
work ofdirector Humphrey Jennings and his depiction of Britons of all classes joined together in
the war effort. Elsewhere, Richards (1988) examined Briain's att€mpts to pres€nt an accurate
depiction its natiorul character.
Short (198E) considered the use ofBritish films between 1939 and l94l to promote and
Anglo-American alliance, contending that the "question of whether Great Britain was a
democracy" (p. l2l) nnas the most pressing for British films to answer during this period.
According to Short, British films were able to portray Briain as a &mocracy despite the
trappings of the monarclry.
Summary
A limited number ofstudies have exanrined the role ofBritish propaganda in the United
States during the Second lVorld War. While some atention has been given to the coltent and
role of films as propaganda during this pcriod, little attention has been given to the content of
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radio broadcasts and printed materials. This study will attempt to fill that 9p through the
method described in the following chaper.
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Chapter trI: Rationale and Method
Rationale
This study is proposed to fill a gap in the lircrature on Great Britain's use ofpropaganda
in the United States between 1939 and 1941. This goal will be accomplished by applying
Burke's concept of identification and Fisher's logic of good reasons to British propaganda
materials, including radio scripts, newsletten, anicles, and pamphlets. Previous studies of
British propaganda in the U.S. have not only failed to offer a substantive discussion of content,
but havc also neglected any application ofthese theories to these discussions.
Additionally, therc appears to be no attempt to apply either the concepts of identification
or the logic of good reasons to propaganda Consequently, this study will provide a new
approach to the understanding of propaganda as well a new application for these theories.
There are sweral reasons that I have elected to use the combindion of identification and
the logic of good rsasons. First, as Brewer (197) noted, Britain needed to cultivate a "special
relationship" (p. 5) with th€ United States. The need for such a relationship meant that Britain
needed to identi$ with ib ardience; the importance ofwhich has already been suggested by
those studies (Calder, l99l; Cull, 1993, 195; Graves, l94l) that have reported Britain's efforts
to Americanize its radio broadcasts. While little elaboration of the Americanization of British
broadcasts has been p,rovided, Cull (193, 1995) notes that the BBC began making extensive use
of Canadian brodcasters and British announcers who did not have the Oxfordian accents
thouglrt to be repetlentto U.S. listen€rs" Additionally, the BBC shifted from its standard thirry-
minute program fonDat to the fifteen-minute format that Americans werE accustomed to.
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Identifuing Britain with the United States, howwer, would not be enough to bring the
assistance Britain desired. Because the Unircd States was firmly entrenched in isolationism
duringthisperiod@rewer, 1997; Cole, 1953; Cull, 1995; Hachey, l97l'72; Kennedy, 1999;
Taylor, 1990), it would take morc than a rEcognition of likeness with Great Britain to bring about
actions that could succeed in drawing the United States into war. Britain uould need to reinforce
its efforts with facts, that is, values that were relevant to its audiencc and consistert with the
beliefs of that audience.
Method
This thesis will examine existing available marcrials, including radio scripts, pamphlets,
and other publications, for the presence ofthose themes deemed primary to the pr€sentation of
The People's War: democracy, strength and courage, Christianity, equality and civilization.
Materials will then be examined for the presence of identification and the role of the five
dimensions ofthe logic ofgood reasons, as described below. Each chapter ofanalysis will be
divided into the three phases of British propaganda described in chaper I to allow for the
progression of British propaganda to be documenkd and considercd.
Identification
This analysis will begin with the application ofBurlce's concept ofidentification. Burke
(1969) describes identification as the process that takes place when B is identified with A and
they become subsuntially one. In being identified with A B is subsantially one "with a person
other than himself'(l%9, p. 21). Burke suggests that identifcation is driven by our need to
connect with othcrs itr an effort to overoome separatereris. It is because of this genuine need to
connect tbst identification can be a powerful tool for penuasion (Cheney, l9E3; Quigley, 2000).
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Burke (1969) ofrers three sources of identification: idealisric, materialistic, and
formalistic. Idertification through the i&alistic is motivated by ideals, values, and beliefs, while
materialistic identification revolves around properties. Burke's third source of identificatiotu
formalistic, is motivated by devices including the ethymeme and antithesis (Burkq 1969; Veitctt,
1972). However, many ofthose who have interpreEd Burke (Cheney, 1983; Olson, 1980; Perez,
20c|0; Quieley, 2000 Thompson & ThompsotL 2000) suggest that these devices are less a source
of identification then a means for accomplishing it.
Further interpretation of Burke's work has revealed several srategies commonly
employed to accomplish identification. Cheney (1983) suggesS three sfistegies: the common
groud strategy in which the speaker associates him or herself with the audience. Identification
through dissociation, or antithesis, that allows for the creation ofa common enemy; and the use
of the transcendent'\ve" "both a subtle and powerful strategy hause it goes rmnoticed"
(Cheney, 1933, p. 154). Additionally, Quigley (2000) proposes identification tlrough
representation.
others have added to the study of identification, including lvlarlan (1967) who suggests
that consubstantiality is the result and desired goal of identification. Miller (1965) proposes that
ethical relativisrn determines an individrul's attitudes and predisposition and dicates the degree
to which identification can occur. This notion is shared by Miller and Neilsen (1972) who
conclude that the degree of identification is not limitless.
Criteria for evaluatinc identification After mabrials have been examined for the
prescnce ofthe prcviously identified themes, atention will be giveir to the use of identification.
Fint I will s€ek to determine the pesence of identifications within iodividual scripts pamphlcts,
articles, and books. Once these atternpts have been locatd sevenl questions will be posed.
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First, is the source of the ideirtification idealistic or materialistic? What is the stratery employed
to make thc identification? Finally, I will seek to determine the role idertification plays in each
individual piece. Consideration will also be given to the ways in which the use of idertification
changes from one phase of p,ropaganda to another, if at all.
The loeic of fu Reasons. Fisher's (1989) //zzar Cort rnunication as Nanotion:
Tovard a Philosophy of Reason, Action and Values provides what tlre author calls the logic of
good reason. The concep ofa logic of good reasons is part ofFisher's narative paradign thet
contends that "humans are storytellers" (p. 64) who rely on a logic of good reasons as a mode of
decision making. These good reasons, Fisher contends, provide a warrant for action.
Fisher's (19E9) logic of giood reasons consists of five elements or dimensions. First, fact:
What are tlre values, both implicit and explicit, contained within the message? Secon4
relevance: Are the values presented appropiate for the decision being sought? ltrave relevant
facts been omitted or distorted? Thir4 consequences: What effects are likcly to result if the
audience acts on the advice ofthe messagp? Fourth, consistency: Are the values presented
consistent with the personal experiences and values ofthe audience? Fiffh, transcendent values:
Fisher refers to ransceadert values as those of "ultimate valrr... generally aken for gfanted by
the arguer, but when brought to the surface tlrey reveal one's most fundament commitrents"
(p.l0e).
The logic of good reasons has been applied to a number oftopics including Smith (19E9)
studied the l9&4 Democratic and Republican platforms. Bush and Bush (1994) applied the
narrative paradigm to television adv€rtising. Rowlaod (1989) applies the narrative paradign to
three works ofnon-fiction and suggested that the ambiguities ofFislrer's narrative paradignr
difEculty to apply universally.
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Evaluation ofthe Losic ofcood Reason
Facts. the Transcendcnt Issue. and Consistency. Anicles, scripts, and other texts will be
examined for the presence of the previously identified primary themes. The implicit and explicit
values of these materials will then be identified. It should be noted that tha, the primary themes
may prove indicative of the values offered. However, I will attemp to determine what, if any
differences manifest between the primary thernes and implicit and explicit valrrcs. I will also
examine materials to determine if difrercnt values, or combinations of values, are presented from
one phase of propagmda to another.
After having examined tlrc values presented in the materials, attention will be given to
transcendent value dimension. In addition to identiffing the transcendent issue, or issues, their
presentation and role throughout the phases of British propaganda will be examircd.
Following the study of the values and tsanscendert issues, the issue of consistency will be
addresscd. In determining the consistencl of the values presemed b,y Britain with that of its
audience, tlre findings ofthe previous chapers involving identification, values, and the
transcendent issrs will be recalled.
Evaluation ofConsequences and Relevance. Attention will then turn to the dimensions
of consequence and relevance. Here the British'story" will be contrxed with that ofthe
isolationists. Given that the consequences ofU.S. assisance to Britain or involvement in the war
were ofconsiderable imporhnce to the isolationist case, the issues ofconsequence and relevance
will be dealt with conjointly.
In examining the dimcnsion of coosequenceg scveral questions will be posed. First, u/hat
did British propaganda suggest would be the consequences if America failed to provide support
and assistrnce to the ryar effort? What did British propaganda suggest would be the
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consoquences ifAmerica did provide support and sssistance? What other consequences might
an audience have inferred from these messages? Do these additional oonsequences support or
contadict the British position? Again, I will examine any changes in both consisency and
possible consequences thLroughout the phases and mediums of British propaganda
tvlarcrials will also be examined for their relevance to the isolationist argunent against
U.S. aid and sup'port Again, the issue ofrelevance will be considered in each ofthe three phases
of British propoganda by posing several questions. which point, or points, ofthe isolationist
argument have been addressed? How have these issues been addressed? Did Britain avoid or
distort any ofthe issues raised by isolationists?
Materials
cull (1995) suggests that "after th€ war, Britain seems to have tied to destroy evidence
of its war propaganda in the United States" (p. 4) in an effort to avoid tlre embanassment that
followed their efrorts in World War One. With that in mind, I have attempted to gather
examples of any existing available marcrials with the exceptions of films. Films have been
excluded ftom this study because they were the topic ofnumerous sfirdies as was indicated in the
chapter 2. Ttre study of British propaganda in the United Sates will benefit more from the
examination of p€viously igrorcd materials.
The materials to be reviewed in this study will include: articles taken from Britain To-
Day, produced by the Brirish Council; scripts from J.B. Priestley's Erirain Speaf,s and Blward R.
Murrow's broadcasts from London; selections ftom Bulletins from Britain Foduced by the
British Library of Information in New York (BLINY); as well as miscellaneous pamphlaq
scripts and audio recordings produced by Britain for American consumption between 1939 and
l94l . Thesc marerials have been gathered from the British Library in Londoq England; the
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BBC Written Archives Cente in Reading England; The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in
Hyde Parlq NY; the Radio Archives of the Univcrsity of Memphis, Tennessoe; and various
private collectors.
Briain To-Dav. I have examined one article from each issue of the first three volumes of
Britain To-Day, published by the British Council betwecn tvlarch 17, 1939, and December 19,
1941. This publication's self sated-purpose was to "bring the friends, and for that matter, the
critics of Great Britain into closer touch with the happenings in our country" (Foreword, 1939, p.
1).
It should be noted that, drr to coffight rcstrictions imposcd by the British Library, only
one article from each issue of Ezra in To-Dry cottldbe photocopied for analysis. ln selecting
articles from Erira in To-Day, 1nec;es were chosen that appeared to represefr the major thernes of
the People's War without being atypical of the issue's content as a whole.
Britain Soeaks. Also included in the analysis will be scripts from J.B. Priestley's Eriraiz
Spea,ts. The program was bmadcast weekly via the BBC North American Service beginning in
May 1940. Scrips from the period of May 30 to Septonber 24,1940, are conained with the
1940 publication Bntain Speaks.In addition to tlre Britain Spea*s *ripts, this collection also
includes scripts ofPricstley's domestic Posrscrip broadcasts. Because Postscnpd was available
to U.S. audience's via the BBC North American service and werc published in the U.S. along
witb Britain Speaks scrips, tlrcy are eligible for inclusion
Additional scripts, from October l, 1940, to D€c€mber 28,1941, have been acquired from
the BBC Written Archives Cente (WAC) in Rcading England Two scripts from each month
between October I, 19l(), and December 15, 1941, halfofthe scripts produced during this
period, rcre provided by Susan Knowles ofthe BBC WAC at my request Given the
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consistency ofthe content and use of themes in Priestley's work this seeins to be an adequate
r€presefi ation of program.
Britain Speaks conld mos easily be described as a celebration of tlr heroism ofthe
average Briton at war, epitomizing the "People's War" concept (Brewer, 1997; Calder, l99l;
Cull, 1993). Moreover, Priestley represented a conscious decision on the part ofthe BBC to
move away from the dry content and "tCxford" accents thought to be repellent to a U.S. audience
as well to the appeararrce of editorial Mom (Brewer, 1997; Briggs, 1979; Cull, 1993).
Edward R. Murrow scrips. Transcrips of I 34 of Munow's broadcasts from london, as
collected in This is Lordon and In Semch of the Light.beginningwith August 19, 1939, will be
included for analysis. Although not employed by the British govemment or the BBC, Edward
Munow, as director ofCBS European services, is widely regarded as having been one of the
more potent propaganda tools employed by Great Britain @riggs, 197; Calder, l99l; Cull,
1993, 1995). Murrow's contribution to the British cause was not accidental, but rather his
support wns carefully courted by BBC ofEcials who took efrorts to provide him and other
American journalists with access to sites aod infonnation denied the British press. The reality of
Murrow's role in British propaganda may be illusrated by his participation in an *unofiicial"
conference held by members of the Ministry of Information regarding possible methods of
cultivating favorable U.S. opinion (Cull, 1993).
Bulletins from Britain. The l94l issues ofBzl/erins from Britain, prroduced and disEibuted
by the British Library of Information in New York (BLINI), will also be included The Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library tras made fifteen ofthe tucnty-one issues produced during this period
available in their entirey. This publication was distributed to those parties who identified
themselves as interpsted in ttre British cause as well as those visiting or making inquiries at
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BLINY. The newslctter *intended to give an intimste knowledge of the Empire's war effort...
and its impact on the war on the daily lives of its peopl e" (Bulletins from Britain, l94l , p. l).
Miscellaneous pamohleb. ln a&iaonlo Btlletins from Britain,BLINY produced a
number of pamphlets also distributed upon reqrcst and mailed to i&ntified interested parties and
opinion malcers (McKenzie, 1942). The following have been gathered for consideration: Brr?islr
Farners at llar: Jack Jones, British Miner-Novelist-Playwright Addresses a Gathering at the
II.IILW.A. at Pittsburgh PA, September lE, I94l; liltales in War-Time: IuIy America, Labour's
Achieveme s and the Gml; and Peace Aims: Aflicial British Statements. The Ministry of
Information also produced several toxts that will be included within this work:. The British
System of Government, The Battle of Britain, wtd The British Farmer at War.
Additional scripts and broadcasts. In addition to these sources, some discussion may be
made, largely for the purpose of providing contex! of tlre programs FrontJine Family arlrd
Answering loz. The National Sound Archives ofthe British Library contains three episodes of
Fron-line Fanity ard- two of Answering l/aa materials that cannot be duplicated Additionally,
two FrontJine Famrly scrips have survived at the BBC Written Archives Centre. Although it
urould be impossible to determirrc, bas€d on such a limiM sampling n'traher the available
materials arc indicative ofthe series as a whole, they are, nonetheless worth discussing for the
ability to lend context to the tone of British propagatrda in 1941.
S€lection of lviaterials
Given the large nurnber of individual soipB and anicles represented by these materials, it
would be impossible for all of them to be represented in the analysis. Consequently, I have
selected a limited number of articles, scri6 and pemphlets for aralysis using the following
prcess. First, all materials werE examined for the presence of the major themes of tle People's
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War. The absence of such themes resulted in the exclusion ofnro pampbleal. Labour's
Achievemeru ond the Gul, afr Peace Aims: Aflicial British Statemens, which apear to have
been created to provide background information forjoumalists, rather than addrcss the general
public. The remainder of the maierials were then examined firs for idertification and then for
the standards ofthe logic of good reasons applied to them. This pocess revealed trcmendous
consisrency within the materials. Since every article, scritr, and pamphlet could ttot be included
in the amlysis, I have selected items that illusEate the use of identification and the dimensions of
the logic of good reasons throughout that particular source. These illustrative examples provide
insight into the role these theories play in each phase ofeach source.
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Chapter IV: Identifi cation
Identifi cation and Consubsantiality
Burke (1969) contends that humans are driven by a necd to overcome th€ir separateness
created by being biological beings and members of different classes. As such we attempt to
identi$ with others through communication. Burke explains that while two colleagues are not
identical, "Insofar as their interests are joine4 A is identified with B" (p. 20). Burke also offen
that A * may identi$ himself with B even when their intercsts arc not joined" (p. 20) if he
assumes or is persuaded their interests are joined.
The result ofthis overlapping, orjoining of intercsts is what Burke (1969) refers to as
comubstantiality. Once consubstantiality has occurred, the two parties are joined, becoming
"substantially one" (Burke, 1969, p. 2l) with someone other than themselves. However, despite
beingjoined through their shared substance, the parties still remain unique individuals. This can
be likened to a child who, despite being consubstantial with its parents, remains a unique entity.
Identification, theq is not an identity, but rather a commonality (Percz, 2000).
The fact that identification is made possible precisely because ofa human need to
overcome our separateness through communication (Burke, 1969) enables it to be used as an
effective tool of penuasion (Cheney, l9E3; Quigley, 2000). However, success in creating
identification with its audience is limited in that identification can only be accomplished "insofar
as you can talk his language" @urte, 1969, p. 55). This languge is not limited to spoken words
and can irrclude "gcstures, tonality, image, anitude and idea'(p. 55). Miller (1965) also notes
that an individual's anitudes and beliefs determine the degree to which identification can occur.
Simply stated, '1he more violent your opposition, the weaker your surrender" Burk e, 1969 , p.
55).
30
Hahaingon: Thc People's war
Sources of Identification
From Burke's writings, three sources of identification have been distinguished: idealistic,
materialistic, and formalistic (Littlejohl 1999:Perc2,2000; Quigley,2000). Idealistic
identifications can be seen as those relating to attitudes, beliefs, or ideas (Quigley).
Identification through property or materialistic identification can pertain to any form of
eoonomic property the appeal ofthat common or covetd (Burke, 1969). For example, in an
analysis of identification in relation to Dian4 Princess of Wales, Quigley (20m) srygests that
material identification took place between the Princess and her female audience. These
individuals identified with Diana's clothing and belongings not because they themselves
possessed them, but because ttrcy reflected what they would have liked to possess'
Burke's notion of formalistic idemific*ion is somewhc less clear. Burke (1969) offen a
number of formal dwices ranging from antithesis to the ethymerng' as means of accomplishing
formal identification. This form of identification can help in "awakening an anitude of
collaborative expecancy' (Burke, 1969, p. 55). However, many ofthose who have expanded on
Burke's work (Cheney, 1983; Olsotr, 1980; Perea 2000; Quigley,2000; Thompeon &
Thompaon, 2000) have interpreted these devices as a means of accomplishing identification. For
example, antithesis might be used within an idealistic i&ntification.
Identifi cation Stateeies
Understanding the sources, or motives, ofidentification is useful, but it does not permit a
full understanding of the process. In order to gain such an understanding it is also necessary to
examine the strategies employed to accomplish identification. Several identification statcgies
can be inferred ftom Burke's worls. Cheney (19t3) poinb to three such straEgies that arc
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prominent in the idemification process: the common ground straregy, identification through the
assurned or transcendent'\re," ard idemification through dissociation or antithesis. Quigley
(2000) adds to this list identification through representation.
The common ground strategy, best descriH as identification through association, is the
most overt form of identi{ication Here the speaker links him or herself with the audience
through a shared interests or attitudes (Cheney, 1983). Burke provides the example of "tlrc
politician, who, addressing an audience offaflners says, 'I was a farm boy myself"' However,
this sfategy may also be applied in a much more implicit fashion.
The transcendent'te" is "both a subtle and powerful starcgy because it goes unnoticed"
(Cheney, t9E3, p. 154). Burke (1972) illustrates the point: " My prime example is the word 'we'
as when the saEment that 'we' arc at war includes under the same head the soldien who are
getting killed and the spectators who are making a killing in war Socks" (p. 2E). The assumed
..we,,, along with its sunogate forms, can convey a commonality between the message sender
and the audience.
Identification through dissociation, or antithesis, allows the speaker to unite with the
audience against a cornmon fiemy (Burke, t969) by highlighting the ways in which they arc
unlike that errrny. In other words, by dissociating with a pany, new aisociatioul can be made.
For example, Britain freqwntly highlights the ways in which Germany or Nazism difrers from
them and. in turn from funerica.
Quigtey (2000) offers the strategy of identification through represenation. In this
instance the audiencc identifies with an individrul or party that are doing things that the audience
would like to do, but are unable to. Quigley agatn offers Dian4 Princess of Wales, all someone
many identified with becausc she was able to sbnd for issues or visit places on their behalf in a
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way that they would be unable to. While not as promincr as the previously mentioned
sraiegies, identification through representation was used with some efect by Great Britain in the
efforts to identifu with American audiences.
Identification and British Propamnda
At the start oftheir war effort Great Britain frced numerous and considerable obstacles in
gaining American assistancc. In addition to the preserrce ofNeutrality Acts and a pervasive
isolationist mindsei U.S. public opinion was divided on the matter of aid to Britain and Britain
in general (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997:'Taylor,1990). In its effort to gain American
assistance Britain needed to present their case in such a way that it would be relevant to its U.S.
audience. Subsequently, Britain endeavored to establish that it was "substantially one" (Burke,
1969, p. 20) with the United States. In doing so the British cause woul4 eventrmlly, become the
American cause
The decision to present the war as 'b people's war" was one desiped specifically to
appeal to a u.S. audience (cull, 1995) through themes they could identiff with including
dernocrac.v, freedom, Christianity, and coqrage (Brcwer, I 997; Cull, 1993 , 1995: Graves, I 94 I ;
Taylor, 1990). The rse of identificatioo, combined with a prcsentation of good reasons, to be
discussed in laEr chapters, would pove a persuasive tool in Britain's efrorts to secure U.S.
support.
It is important to un&rstand that British propaganda was an ongoing and evolving
process. Is success or lack thereof, could not be attributed to any one broadcasl pamphlet, or
public*ion. Burke ( I %9) explains tlra *offen we must thitrk of rtetoric not in terms of one
porticular address, but as a general body of identifications that owe their convincinpess much
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more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcements" (p.26). It is this method, one of daily
reinforcements and repetitio,n, that Britain employs as it atrcmpts to identifr with its audicnce.
Method of Analysis
This chaper will explore the use ofidentification in British pnopaganda in the United
States within the themes deemed cenral to the depiction of the People's War by numerous
studies (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997;Taylor,1990): democracy, stength and courage;
Christianity, civilizatioq and class equlity. In analyzing materials these themes have been given
a liberal interprctarion to allow a full exploration of each theme and its application. lvlaterials
classified under the category of democracy may make explicit refercnces to democracy, or may
pres€nt associated concepts such as freedom and liberty. Strength and courage includes military,
national, and personal stength as well as heroism and sacrifice. The theme of Ckistianity may
include not only overt references to the Christian BitlL but also refererrces to faith ard religious
symbols. The theme of civilization may include references to educatiorL thc arts and humanities,
and other similar concepts. Class and equality will involve any concepts relarcd to social or
economic disparity. As these themes have been derived from overviena ofBritish propaganda
in the U.S. (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1993,1995,1997; Graves, l94l; Taylor, 1990), it is possible, if
not likely, that wery therne will not be represented in each plrase or by all of the materials being
considered.
Materials will tlrcn be examired for the presence of idcntifications and the following
questions will be asked: (l) What is the "souce" of identification? Is it idealistic or
materialistic? A review ofthe materials has shown no widence of formalistic identifications. In
some instances, formal devices are applied with materialistic and idealistic identificetions, but in
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thesc instarrces they serve only as devices. (2) what stralery is being employed? (3) In what
cortext is the identification made?
Phase I: Introducing Britsin (March 1939 to April l%0)
Britain's initial propaganda efforts in the Unircd States focus upon the shared ideals of
denrocracy, freedom, and liberty. British propagand4 in the form ofthe Bitish Council's
Britain To-Day stffs€d Britain's dedication to democratic ideals in an effort to idertii, with
Americans Meanwhile, the broadcass of Eduard R. Murrow provided Americans with the
opportunity to see a conty on the verge ofand at war. Hoivever, emphasis on news and
information as propoganda was hindered by the fact that "there isn't much news" (Murrow,
1941, p.36).
Democraclr
Britain ToDay. The first article of Britain To-Day's premier issue d€rives its source of
identification from the ideal ofdemocracy. The opening paragraph of *Dernocracy in a
Changrng World" ( I 939) esablishes an association with America through is proud 'boast "
(p.1) of a tradition of democracy. This radition has provided Britain with "orrdeled change" and
"free enterprise. "
The author invoked the Unid StaEs Constitution and the advanages of "liberty" and
"ttre rights of free speectu tbe froedom of the press, the ffiom of public meeting and
association" ("Democracy in a Changing World", 1939, p. 3). tlaving assurned the very
foundation upon which American de,mocracy uas built as Britain's owr! the article went on to
imply that it rvas the responsibility ofthose who have benefitted from the tenets ofdernocracy to
defend them &om any who might threaten them.
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The article used dernocncy both to associate itself with the U.S and dissociate both from
the nondemocratic Germany. 'A Test of Neryes" (1939) linked Britain agin to the freedom of
speech doctrine as it reminded the reader that Britain is a land of "free expression" (p. 2). In this
democratic land, *truth and confi&nce" (p.3) arc paramount.
In addition to identifting with the U.S. through dernocratic principles, Britsin contrasted
itself apinst the tactics of Germany and German propaganda. As tensions in Europe escalated,
the German propaganda machine had begun stressing its supposed sbength and Britain's alleged
weaknesses (Taylor, 1990). According to this article, these actics were out of place in a
democratic society an( morc importantly, they could not be believed.
As Briain continued to dissociate itself from Germany, it also took the oppornmity to
place a spin on its own past and present propagianda efforts. As the article expressed its
contempt for the grotesque "eloggerations" ('A Test ofNerves", 1939, p. 2) ofGermany's
propsgand4 it offercd its own overstotement, claiming that Britain itself had been "slow to
realize" the power of propaganda and would be "loathsome [sic] to use it" (p. 2). The satement,
when applied in conjurrction with the association with America and dissociation from Germany,
attempted to begin the process ofvanquishing the legacy ofBritain's ltrorld War I propaganda
(Brcwer, 1997; Cull, 195) and help promote Britain's current claims of "no propaganda."
A similar appoach was taken shortly after Britain's declartion of war on Germatry. In a
November 12, 1939 article, 'Ttrc Right to Grumble," Britain again called upon the ideal of
democracy to identi$, with ia U.S. audience. The articlg which opened with the words "In a
democratic nation like ours" first seeks to quelch stories of British discontent with the fledgling
war movement and the "inconveniences" (p. l) that accompanied it.
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After it associated with readss through democracy, the article prcceeded to invoke the
principle of freedom of speoch. Dissociating fiom Germany to ftrther identift with the U.S.,
this article suggests the lack of free speech and expression in totalitarianism regimes. The
"avemge Englishman" ('Tlp Right to Grumble," 1939, p.l) might grumble, but that is bccause
they are permitGd to. In addition to identifying through its association with dernocrary and
freedom of spoech and dissociating with Germany ideology, this article addresses the charge of
*confusion and disorder" (p. 2) in a manner with which many Americans would likely be
familiar. Aside from the lofty ideological notion of free speech, the scenario ofcomplaining
about governmental policies is likely to be one most readers would be familiar with.
Streneth and Courase
Britain To.Day. In the early stages of the war srength and courage were typically
conveyed by the depiction ofa British people rcady and willing to defend their nation. In this
phase of British propagandc the theme of srength and courage was promotcd through the
identification burt was not the source of the identification. For example, "Democracy ih a
Changing World" (1939) esablished its common ground with the U.S. through the ideals of
democracy and then proceeded to ofrer thar thesc ideals provide the citizers of democratic
nations with the *courage, loyalty and will" (p. 3) to defend the principles they trcasue.
British propagardists h8d recognized women as an utapped resource in the battle for
public opinion (Cull, 1995). The role of women was frequently emphasized as a means of
identi$ing with American housewives tbrough representation. Though its shategy is far les
direct thrn otlrer materials discussed to this point, "British Women in War-Time" ( I %0)
atternpted to appeal to the women of America by presenting the pivotal role British women
urould have in securing the sbength and security of her corrnfy.
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Quigley (2000) explained that audienccs can idemiry with a representation ofwhat they
or what they would like to be. In this insrance the depictiom of the'toung women" of Britain
making a valuable conribution to their nation's war effort could have appealed to young
American women. This was particulady tue in a period when America's Fint Lady, Eleanor
Rooswe lt, was demonshating the extent of feminine strength and ability (Goodwitt, 194).
Eduard R. Murrow. Britain's reliance on Murrow to convey their situation to American
audiences was, in itself, a form of identification through association. Britain carefully cultivated
is relationship with Murrow and other U.S. correspondeirts and it would pay off- in time (Cull,
1993, 1995). However, at the sart of the war Murrow viewed Britain's attempts 8t appeasement
with'diseust'' (Persico, l9tE, p. 142). Murrow alrc regarded Britain as an "unimporant
museum piece" (Cull, 1995, p. 15) with little chance of winning the war.
Murrow gradually became convinc,ed of the st€ngth and resolution ofthe British people
and his fansformation is noticeable within tanscripts of his broadcasts from hndon. The fact
that the people and events that sunounded him (Cull, 193, 1995) changed Murrow's opinion
made him an even more effective witress. Perhaps most imporarg Munow was already trusted
by his audience (Cull, 1993; Graves, l9{l; McKenzie, 1942; Penico, 1988). Unlike Britain, his
credibility had never been impugned
Murrow's broadcast ofAugus 31, 1939, employed the ideal of frmily as its source of
identification On that day the announcement was made tbat children, as well as the disabled,
would be evacuated from a number of English cities inclrding londoq Liverpool and
Manchester. Murrow asked his listeners to 'inugine" ( I 94 I , p. 6) that they are a member of a
family hearing sr.rch atr atrnounoement. He described children carrying gas masks. The story
used what Bu*e (1969) refereed to as 'commonplaces" (p. 58), those things or notions that we
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are all familiar wit[ to make its identification. Any listener, whaher a parent or not, can
understaill the concept offamilial love and the horror of separation. The identification was
made more powerful as the image of the gas mask helps to dissociate England from Germany 
-
which implicitly became the enemy of family.
In another broadcast, the source of idertification is materialistic. On October 15, 1939,
Murmw described the sites of London in the ureek immediarcly following ttre declaration of
war. Shops that once carried men's suits now had window displays of soldiers' uniforms.
Throughout the city houses were abandoncd or are for sale. Automobile showrooms have closed
down and fashionable women's attirc replaced with one-piece suits with zippen and hoods that
can be wom to the bomb shelters. Murrow's descripion of these scenes was neither sentimental
nor dramatic. Instea4 he merely recounted the scene and allowed the listener to make his or her
own determinations.
Christianitv
Britain To-Day. Just as it had done with democracy, Britain To-Day proi&s an overt
association with its audience using the ideal of Christianity. Even while at war Christmas in
Britain rernains a *frmily festival and season of good ftllowship" C'Tbe English Ckistnus,
1939, p. l). Tlre association with the U.S. was followed by dissociation with Germany as the
article presented g6rrin as a'€histian coury" (p. 2) that had faith tlrcy would prevail over
Germany's 'advance of paganism" that tbrearens them.
Phase II: Britain Takes It and Carries On (lv{ay to December 1940)
The end oftk 'phony war" provided Britain with the opportunity to begin dernonstrating
its srength and rcsolve to American audienoes. The Battle of Britain saw England deliver
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Germany its first significant defcar in air batrle (Flart, l97l). Shortly thereaffer, london
withstood the mprece&nted bombing during the BliE (Cull, 1995) ard lived to tell abou it.
The introduction of the BBC North American Service in May 1940 would provided U.S.
listenen with greater aocess to Briain through an array of enterainment and news programs
(Cull, 1993). Included in thcse broa&asts wu Britain Speaks, hosrcd by Yorkshire playwright
J.B. Priestley. Priestley's broadcasts presented a "dynamic picture ofa united Britain engaged in
a People's War" (Cull, 1995, p. 8l).
Throughout this period, Briain continued to use i&ntification relating to themc of
democracy. However, the depiction of strength and the ability to carry on despite the odds
became increasingly important.
Democracy
Britain ToDav. As the "phony war" came to a close, Briain prepared for a much-
anticiparcd German bliuhieg. England began taking steps to'baffle the possible parachute
soldier" ("War and Rural Briain " 19a0, p. I ). Throughout the counry landmarls were covered
and road signs were aken down. Elsewhere, it is reported that two million acres of grassland
had boen sowed for food p,roduction. This Herculean task was done "in the dernocratic way of
doing things" (p. 2). Once Britain's efforts were identified with democracy we are reminded that
dernocracy carries a price: responsibility.
Britain Speaks. Priestley was much less srDtle in his invocations of democratic themes to
identi$ with his audience. In a lvlay l%0 broodcast Pricstl€y addrcssed the isue of Americans
who had choscn to leave England since the outbreak ofthe war: 'Amcricans leaving England at
this critical time arc &sening their own cause 
- 
Freedom and Liberty, The American Frontier is
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the English Channel" (Priestley, 19,t0, pp. 3-4). The passage may also be construed as a
condernnation ofthose Americans who rvere prepared to abondon or ignore the British cause.
Priestly (1940) folloured this overt identification by dissociating England from the
"gigantic, insane gangsteri$n" of Nazisnr. This is followed by the declaration that tlrere are *rw'o
ways of life: theirs and ours" (p. 4). "Oun" employs a form of the transcendent'\ve" that scwed
to reinforce the shared substance between British and American ideals while pointing to
Germany as the common enemy.
orre hundred and sixty-four yean after the United States declared independence from
Britain, Priesly claimed America's Independence Day as Britain's own. Speaking on July 4,
1910, Priestley fint allegd threats ofviolence toward the fanilies ofFrench troops by Nazis:
"Can you imagine Briain or the United States. .. resorting to foul racketeer mahods ofthis
knd?" (p. 8 l ). The common eruny had been establishe4 and Priestley went on to wed th€ very
foundations ofthe United Starcs to the British cause: "Today is Independence Day. It is a good
day to realize all over apin that we mean what we say just as Americans meant what tlrcy said
nearly one hundred and seventy years ago. Our aim is the independence of Europe - and indeed
the whole world..." (p. El).
The Swcm of British Governmem. This 1940 pamphlet took a tortbook ap,proach to
explain the British governmeat to Amcrican rcaders. As in the past the democratic system and
principles of Briain rryere strcssed The British can select their govemment, speak and assemble
freely and are immune from aftitrary prosecution. Strictly spea.king thc pamphlet m€ets the
criteria for idcntification in that it sets forth sharcd values and provides the rcader with the ability
to recognize this shared substance. Howwcr, when compared with other examples it is weaker
for two reasons. First, the formd tone and scholarly approach are not perticularly inviting
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More importantly, Robson's pamphlet presents facts without a story or narrativc that the reader
might find compelling.
Mv America Anotlrcr of the BLINY pamphlets distributed during this period came in
the form of a chapter of lnrd Tweedsmuir, otherwise known as John Buchan's (1940) Pilgrin's
Way-Tfu ctrrlplrr. reflectcd Brrchan's impressions of America ircluding religion and democracy.
Buchan explicitly linked the nations through the shared values ofdemocracy. However, Buchan
followed this by saying of American democracy, " This she owes to her history... the British
tradition" (p. l5). The reader who has accepted the identification based on sharcd democratic
principles may then proceed to accept the claim thd American owes its dernocracy to Briain.
Assuming the readers have made this connection, tlrey may also conclude that they have a
responsibility to Briain.
Srensth and Courace
Britain ToDay. With the Battlc of Briain imminent, Britain To-Day *rt$t to
accomplish its identification with American readers by dissociating themselves from the
"intimidation, deception, inrigue and treason" C'The Will to Victory," I 940, p. I ). This treachery
is contasted with the "unfaltering morale ofthe Britisb people" (p. 2)
A similar approach was used during the Bliv. "The Battle of London" offercd the
courage of Londoners whose homes and businesses are being destroyed against the "weak"
(1940, p.l) enemy that attack civilian targets. Though the piece used homes and property to
provide a materialistic source for the identification, it failed to establish Germany as a common
oremy to Britain and the United Stares.
Rlward R Munow. Following the fall of France on June 17, 1940, Briain "stood alone"
(Murroq 1941, p.127) in the fight egni15i 11;11er. In describing Britain's situtio4 Murrow
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refer€ed to a speech given by Churchill two weeks prior saying: *they might have to fight alone,
that there would be fighting on the beaches, the larding grounds, in hills and the streets. That
prophecy is near to being fulfilled" (p. 129).
Having identified with Murrow by association, the audience received a uaming from him
ia The Daily Herald (Munow, I % I ). The tabour Party papers cautioned that Americans
"should not be lulled umil almost too late by.. . the splendid slogans of isolationism" (p.l3l).
The words were not Murrow's owD, but by choosing to use th€m he effectively made them his
own.
Murrow ( I 94 I ) provided another example of the marcrialistic source of identificatiotl
this time in the form of the destuction of property. With the Battle of Britain now ragtng he
documented the damage done to civilian areas. Murrow objectively explained that the German
targets were likely military in nature, but also described the damage inflicted to working class
districts. A bomb left one house nothing more ttnn 'Just dust ad rubble" (p.la4). Another hit a
home and took the bathroom offit. Still another hit a fence along side a churc[ smashing the
sain-glassed wittdows.
The scenc used'commonplaces" (Burke 1969, p. 56), in the form ofproperties, that any
mcmber of the audierrce can identi$ with and places them in a situafion most could not identiry
with. After the idemification is made Murrow described the people involved as "calm and
courageous" (1940, p. 145). We leam that Sun&y services were held on schedule at the bombed
church just hours after it was struck. Others irwolved urcre relaxing outdoors reading the Sunday
newspapen shortly after the all clear. The courage of the people was establishc{ and the
normalcy of their routines again served as a mears for i&ntification
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In examining Munow's broadcasts from London during the Blita it is important to recall
Quigtey's (2000) concept of identification through represeoation. Here tlr audience identified
by experiencing a situation vicariously through an agpnt. In many ways Murrow's role during
the Blitz was dangerous, perhaps even adventurous to some. He @uently delivered his
broadcasts from the roof ofthe broadcasting house (Persico' 1988)' Just as in pTevious instances'
Munow's broadcasts emphasizcd the resolve of the British people in the midst of extraordinary
situations.
Murrow's September 10, 1940, broadcast told his listercrs that Germany expec'ted
Londoners to rise up ag3inst their government after a few more nights ofbombing. However,
Munow believed that they were more likely to " rise up and murder a few German pilots ' ( I %0,
p. 163). He also added that those who have "called this a 'people's war' were right. .. I've seen
some terrible sights in this city during these days and nighS, but not once have I heard marU
woman or child suggpst Briain should throw in her hand" (p.163).
For Murrow (1941) a'.routine night" (p. l7l) was one in which intermittent bombing
took place beginning at nine in the evening and lasted for at least eight hours. According to
Murrow the worst part uos the silcnce betrveen the bombs and air raid sircns because it offercd a
chance to "imagine things" (p.l7l).
On September 18, 1940, Murrow infonmed his lisencrs tlra the grearcst problem in
reporting the situation in London was not one of courage or danga. According to Murrow, the
most difficult port of reporting the Bliu was one of langusge. "There are no words to describe
the thing that is happening" (p. 76).
Murrow's broadcasB allowed American liste,ners to live through the Blit They were
hearing it ftom "one oftheir own" in a way that no British reporrcr could have conveyed simply
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because of thcir Britishness. Additionally, Murrow's perceived heroism made his message all
the more appealing and provided the lisener with a greater inceative for nanting to idertifr with
him.
Christianitv
Britain To.Day. The use of the theme of Christianity by Britain To-Day drxingthis
ptuse of the uar is exemplilied in '"The Will to Victory" ( 1940). First the reader was told
explicitly that as a "Christian mtion" (p. l) Britain had the will to overcome'the savagery of
blin4 indiscriminate bombardrnent" (p. l). Flaving linked itself to its Christianity an{ in tum,
Christian readers, the piece corrcluded by noting that the war will not be docided by quantiative
factors, but by Britain's great "spiritual asset"(p. 3) and the moral "righness" (p. 3) oftheir
causa.
Briain Speaks. Priestley's Jrure t6, 1940, broadcast is indicative ofhis use ofChristian
themes, or religiolr, to id€diS with his listeners. Priestley began by noting that the British arc a
religious people with'profound faith in the order ofthe universe" (p. 54). He then explicitly
identified Britain with God: *... it is not so much that God is on our side, but that we ar€ on
God's side" (p. 54). The implicit rnessage was that anyone on the side ofGennany - or in fact
anyone not on Briain's sidc 
- 
uras not on the si& of God.
Priestley's (19,10) other frequently used approach applied the less direct shategy of
dissociation. For example, he explained that Gomany's actions demoostlte "how men can
behave when they lost all hope ofthe Kingdom ofHeaven" (p.70). However, while Nazism has
been bom ftom "rner despait''(p.72) poducing an "evil doctrirc" of hae, Britain was
'communing with our souls, stengthening our faith' (p. 73).
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Priesttey described the bombinduced fires that bumed behind St. Paul's Cathedral. He
agaln juxaposed the "unreason and savagery" of Nazism against the enduring symbol ofreason
and Christian ethics" (1940, p. 229) ofSt. Paul's Cathedral against a sea ofbombinllicted
flunes. The symbolism of a Nazi-inflicted lrellish backdrop apinst the symbol of British religion
further dissociarcd Britain from their pagan enemy.
Mv America. Buchan ( 1940) linked'lthe United Statcs and th€ British Empirc' ( l%0, p.
7) through the tenets of Christianity. Buchan suggested that these beliefs have fostercd a genuine
interes in '1he human race" (p.7) that cause neighbon to rally around each otlrer in times of
disress" (p.7). If readen had accepted Buchan's identification, they could have concluded tlat
not rallying around their neighbors would be to abandom their Christian values.
Civilization
Britain Soeaks. The use of civilization as a means of identification was Spically done in
a manner that dissociates Britain from Germany. While it is possible to see a statement like "in a
civilized nation like ours" as a means to associate with America, it is too ambiguous to form a
strong identification. Howwer, by expressing values, beliefs, and faits that are common with
the two civilized nations, the sharpd suhance can be effectively designated (Bu*e, 1969).
In his June 16, 1940, broadcast Priesttey targeted students at American universities where
pacifist and isolAionist movements were becoming increasingly poputar (Reynolds, 1983). The
broadcast began with praise for the ideal of *America's magrificently democratic educational
system" (1940, p. 49). Beyond Priestley's description of education in funerica as 
*democratic'"
this passage infoduced the concept offlattEry. 'flattery can serve as your poradigp when you
see conditiors ofidentification behind it" (Brrke, 1969, p. 55). So in this instance we see
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identification through the sharcd ideals of democracy and education combined with Priestley's
flattcry.
With the identification made, Priestley dissociated from the Nazis wto have "destroyed
the educational system and indeed all real cultural life" (1940, p.49) in Germany and the nations
it has occupied. In Paris, rrye arc tol{ "learning culturc and wit are in Oe grip ofmen" (p. 50)
who are devoid ofthese qualities. Subseqnntly, it may be inferred that anyone using an
American univenity to enoouragc pacifism or isolationist sentiment nas on the side ofthe
Germany 
- 
the very country that would destroy the *magnificently democratic educational
system" (p. 49).
Class and Eoualiw
Britain Speaks. It has been noted that Britain had been criticized for class disparity. It
uras claimed that England was a land ofthe ruling class (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995). Priestley's
approach in addressing thc issue to dissociae the "ordinary man" from the ruling the ruling
class.'"TherealEnglishpeople,notasmallrulingclassarenowtakingcharge"(1940,p.31).
Priesley's approach of separating the "people" from the ruling class might have provided
listeners with the opportunity to feel for the British people regardless of their opinion ofthe
British governmem However, Priestley did not provide any real basis for identification. The
repea.ed use of phrases sgch as *tlre ordinary man" or'the man on the street" reinforced the
concepS ofthe people's war, but shows m gpouine prcs€nce of s|ared substance (Burke, 1969).
The British Svstem of Government The issue of equality was handled with a somewhat
more obvious use of the common grormd strat€gy in this pamphlet The mder of class and
economic equatity came only after the virtues ofdemocracy have been fully expressed l{aving
associated the turc counties by the ideals ofa democratic system and a democratic spirit, Robson
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(1940) acknowledged thet Britain's progress in areas of social and economic equlity has been
unsatisfactory.
The admission rras likely intended to add to British credibility. A deficit in their
democracy has been admitted and steps would be taken to address that However, it is also
possible that the reader saw this only as a deficit in British democracy.
Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December 1941)
In January l94l President Roosevelt pledged publicly for the first time his "full support'
(Cull, 1995, p. 126) to the Allied cause. The aonouncemem, followed by the possage ofthe lend-
lease bitl, brought a *new dawn in AngloAmerican relations" (p. 126). The transition in public
opinion uas reflected in polls showing that 6 I percent of Americans supported l€nd-lease when
Congess approved it in lvlarcb, compared with 50 percent when it was proposed in January.
This new dawn in Anglo-American reldions was duly reflected in Britain's propaganda
efforts. Propaganda now focused on friendship and alliance. Even though the United States
contribution to the Allies rernained material and financial until December 1941, the presumption
of an alliance was used to finther thst very alliance. The rcpeated refrains of "Briain and
America" recall Bgrke's (1969) demomstration ofthe traoscendent *rve" us€d to itrclude soldier
that ar€ being kitled along with those on the sidelines profrting from the war.
The union fostered by denrocracy was sressed significantly less in this phase. Instea{
stength and courage was emphasized, but in a different marmer thsn was seen in the previous
phase. Now stengfh and courage was demonstrated tbrough simpler acts srrch as coping with
rationing. This change in direction indicated a Britain that is once hoping not to scare away
Americstt support while also pre'paring tlrein for rrar'
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Democracv
Britain To-Dav. *The New Yeat'' began with Srira in To-fuy cele&ating is ally, the
United States. Even though the U.S. was still a *non-belligerent" ('The New Year," 1941, p.l) it
still stood behind Britain in thc preservation of democracy. Togiether the twg would preserve
"freedom, justice and humanity" (p.2). The rcpea:ted pairing of 'Britain and the United States"
esablished a link betu,een the two countries through a form of the transcendeirt we, stressing a
rcam murality. This link was reinforced by the continued refererrces to those ideals shared by
both nations.
'tsritain and America'(l9al) engagpd in the same strategy, beginning with its very title.
Again, the repeated pairing ofthe "Britain and American" served to reinforce the notion of unity.
The identification was firthered through the article's use of Presidem Roosevelt's words
claiming that Britain is "the spearhead of resistance to world conqr.resf'that are used to imply
'the British cause is their cause" (p.l). Unlike Britain, Germany could not count on such
goodwill. Instea{ Germany had to rcly upon fear and intimidation to gain material and financial
support.
Bulletins from BriAin. A similar sfategy was seen throughorfi isws of Bdletins from
Britain For exmnple, in *Hitler's Peace Aims" (1941) Germany was esAblished as the common
enemy of dunocracy as it sought to "render the democratic world impotent" (p. 6). Following
the identifrcation, the article reminded its readers that "only the faint hearted" (p.6) will succumb
to the "pnopaganda ofGcrman peace offers' (p. 6). Ag8tn, in the *Briuin Acquires a New Set of
Values" (Webster, l94l), Britain and the U.S. was associated as "peacc loving democracies"
(p. 1) engagcd in a ..srruggle rh8t is recogized by all as life or death" (p. I ). It was telling ttut
now the struggle was recognized by *all- as life or death. Despite the fact that U.S. isolationism
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had not been eradicate4 Briain eitber downplayed or overlooked it in an atternpt to create a
bandwagon menality.
Sheneth and Courage
Britain Soeaks. Priestle.v's February 9, l%1, btoadcas bcgan with a waming that
German propaganda was "attempting to cr€ate dishtlst and suspicion and a lack oftrust between
us." Britain and the U.S. were idertified through the assumed urc (Chensy, M63) and were
con&onted with the tactics of their common enemy. Since Britain has had the courage to stand
up against Nazi atack, Germany was been forced to use what Priesley described as the "bogey
bogey machine" to scare America they u,rry it had 
- 
unsuccessfully 
- 
tried to scare Briain.
Priesley used humor to further diminish Nazi claims of suength as he described reports
of "anks thar swim, guns that climb tees, fog attacks, and lord knows what else ' (Priestley,
I 94 I , February 9). In doing so he attempted to give assurance to an America that uas on the
verge ofapproving 
- 
or disapproving 
- 
the lendJease bill, that German claims of superiority are
nothing more than talk (Gmdwin, l99a).
The use ofthe assumed nwen was prominent again in hiestley's July 16, 1941, broadcast
describing the "V is for Victory" campaign to his listeners. After describing the use of*\I' to
show resisance throughout occupied Europe, Priestley discussed the rolc *we" 
- 
the Unircd
States and Britain uould play in this mighty snruggle.against Germany. "We have to lcmember
this, that although these people will sure crack and their whole cmry empire will vanish like
smoke, we can no more afrord to lean bsck ard wait than we could if we were in a house with a
wounded tiger" (Priestley, l94lb). Pricstley concluded that '\re are dealing with outlaws"
(Prie$ley, l94lb).
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Bultetins from Britain . Bulletins from Brirarn took two approaches to p,resenting the
rcsolve of the British people to American rcaders. The first rvas through ncws articles dealing
with military maneuvers and campaigns. These pieces will be discussed in later chapers. The
second approach was through more light-hearted means. Bulletins from Britain appears to
confirm Priestley's approach ofdisplsying strcngth through humor as was evident in one short
piece that ap,peared in the April 2, 1941, edition. "Mother Alnays Wim" uses a letter from a
12- year-old to prove British victory is ineviable. "Most people think we will win the war
because Germany is a Fatherland and England is a Motherland. When mother and father fight,
mother always wim" (p. 3). The piece relied upon "commonplaces" (Burke, 1969, p.58) to make
its identification. Motherhoo4 fdherttoo4 ttte bsttles of the sexes, were all things that any
reader could identi$ with on some level. More over, it was typical of the publication's att€mpts
to draw female readers.
Further attempts nrerc used to attract female readers through the columns of Marion
Slater. Slater, we are tol4 was "everyhousewife" (Slater, l9a l, p. l3). Thus lvlarion Slater
identified with all housewives, British and American. The source of Slarcr's identifications was
materialistic, including foo( cosmaics, clothing and otlier "commonplaces" @urke, 1969, p.
58) that every housewife could apreciarc.
In her November 12, 1941, column she dealt with tlrc problems of grocery shopping - a
tlpical act, under the typical conditions of rationing. Basic items like macaroni, fruit, cheese
and butter were covetbd feasures. White Slater admits these are not the "Big Things of the war"
(p.13), she could not deny her ftustration. The following wee\ Norrember 19, 1941, Slarer's
readers were given insight as to how she managed to make a meal with the materials she had
been able to pgrctrase. At the end of the colrrnn she wisdrlly mentioned that she rras going to
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'look at American food advertisements and see if wishfirl thinking can satisry our stomachs"
(Slater, l94lb, p. 5).
Slater's columns made usc ofa form of identifcation through reprcsentation. Slater was
the self-proclaimed "weryhousewife." True, most American housewives would not have envied
her position, but they might admire her ingenuity. Moreover, the columns, and others like tlrcin,
attempted to demonstrate that war presented inconveniences, but nothing that couldn't be
overoome.
Frontline Familv. Only the lvlay 23 and June 5, 1941, recordings and nro additional
scripts from Decernber l94l of Frontlirc Family e$*. This limited amount of material made it
impossible to make any general observations regarding the program. However, the program's
introduction, which rernained the same throughoa the course ofthese episodes, can povide
some insights into this program's ability to identiS with is audience.
Like the Marion Slater columns, this serial uas desiped to appeal to a femsle audience
(Cull, 1993). Everyday lisrcners were provided the opportrmity to live the war vicariously
through the Robinson family. According to tlre induction, tlrc Robinsons were *people like
yourselves, but liviug very different lives 
- 
thinking very differcnt thoughts. To this simple
family, War 
- 
the most terrible calamity to befall the human race is a close, ever present reality.
We bring you this story so that you may share, to some extent, their problems, their heartaches
and theirjoys" (Colley & Colley, l94l).
Notice that the Robinson were a family *just like yourselves'(Colley & Colley, 1941).
Though it is ambiguous, the strt€me'nt allorryed the Robinsons to Provids a link that errornaged
listenen to identiS with thon throughout their exploits. Just as ldarion SlUer was
'everyhousewife" (Slater, l%1, p. l3), tlre Robinsons become "everyfamily'"
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The British Farmer at War. This BLINY pamphlet detailed the considerable etrorts of
the British farmer to make Englsnd self-sufficient. According to Eastcrbroolq "The real heroes
are the farmers. As in Americq dre British farmcrs are strong" (1941, p.l). Though the
staternent identified American and British farmers in favorable terms, the identification was
probleinatic in two uays. First the statcment was made in a section ofthe pamphla entitled "A
Triburc to Dcmocacy" (p. 1). The title clearly intended to serve as further means of
identification, but nothing that follows within the section appeared to rBlate to democracy in any
rmy. Additionally, the likening of Britidr and American farmers seemed to be used gratuitously
and without context.
Christianitv
BullAins from BriAin. Christianity played only a minor role druing this period in the
materials being considered. Only Bulletirc from Britain incorporated themes relarcd to
Christianity, the Churctr, or faith on a regular basis. Dovmey's (1941) "Put an End to This
Terrorism!" nas indicative of the approach used by the publication.
The ideal of religious te€dom rvas used as tlre source of identification in Downey's
(I%l) piece. Downey, the fuchbishop of Liverpool, recormrcd tbe sweeping religious
oppression that has accompanied Nazism noting that "Therc can be few men left on five
continenB who do not tsemble for their legitimate liberties," (p. I ). Downey's observation
served to define Germany and its Nazi regime as an eoemy to one religious freedom, one of the
United States' more clos€ly held tenets.
Later Dowuey employed the assumed'\ile" as he told readers tbat "As Christians it is not
the Nazi or any other blood we should boast. It is the redeeming blood ofChrist which we
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shonld glory" ( I 941 , p. 2). Subsequently all Christians arc united in the common goal of
preserving Mom of religion.
Civilization
Britain Speals. Priestley's N,Iarch 24, I 94 I , broadcast of Britain Speaks was his first
following Congressional approval ofthe lendlease bill. Priesley began by telling listeners how
pleased he uas that we now *stand solidly''(Priestley, 1941, I\,Iarch 24) with England. The
phrase recalled Burke's exarnple ofsaying' 'we' are at war " (1972, p.28) to include both those
fighting and those on the sidelires. Based on Priestley's statement, the U.S. ha4 for all intents
and purposes, joined the war.
Priestley used rural England as an example ofEnglish civilization. The choice of rural
England may reflect efforts of Britain to increase their popularity in rural America (Cull, 1995).
The portrait Priestley peimed is one of a hard norting people who do their jobs without
complaint and for little reward. Howwcr, we leanr, that these were not a disinterested pcople,
they have many "questions and know how to put than" (Priestley, 1941, Ivlarch 24). They are
the "very foundation stones" (Priestley, 1941. March 24) of English civilization. Priestley used
the farmers and laborers of runal Englaod to consruct a portrait ofcivilization that is not built on
inrcllectualism or arts, but dec€ncy and hard work. It is a civilization that rural American allies
could likely identiS with.
Bulletins from Briain. In contrast, "Her Monuments Still Sand" relied upon the
materialistic as s source for its identification The lv{ay 14, t%1, article described "barbarism"
of German attacks upon lordon's most renoumed symbols including Big Bcq the British
Museum, House of Commons and Westminster Abbey. These symbols of BriAin's culture and
civilization still stood desflte Nazi att€Nnpts to 'drEg humanity irto slavery agpin" (p. I ). Here
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Britain dissociatd itsctf from Germany by contrasing its'tnlightenment- and Germany's
"barbarism" (p. l).
Readers were told that 'all good man of good will must be heart sick" ('Her
Monuments Still Shn4" I 94 I , p. I ) at these attacks. This attempt to link with the audience is
broad; however, it sewed as sffective reinforcement to the corce?t that Germalry is the common
enemy; the destruction they wreak is indiscrimimte and not limited to military targets-
Class and Equality
Briain Soeaks. Priestley's January 26, 1941, brcadcast was addresed to friends in the
United States from whom he had received a belaed Christmas gift. The gift was a box of
Romeo and Juliet cigan thaf anived mostly inact. Priestley had associated himself with f iends
in New York and ap,plied the "commonplaces" of Christnas, gifu, and cigars.
Foltowing this somewtrat u/eak idemifictioq Priestley &scribed the'social rwolution"
(Priestley, 1941, Jaruary 26) that has come to Britain As in other inst8lrces, thc issue of class
and economic disparity uas not dcnied. Horvever, the war had changed all tha. Priestley
described the hostel for evacuated women in children of"different backgrounds and classes"
(Priestlcy, 1941, January 26). Everyone at the hostel arc tlrc sarne food and hel@ wittt the
various chores.
Throughout his descripion, Priestley injec-tod hurnor as he discussed being the only male
at the hostel. He feared that it might suddenly shike the women that " this rast idiocy of uar...
was due to the pride and stupidity of the male. Thery could tear me to pieces in two minutcs"
(p.2). Although most in his American audience could not relarc to communal living Priestley
used a humorou sccoario tha his audience could idctttify with to present it. Additionally' the
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broadcast suggested that war c8n help to cure social ills, not only on an intemdional level, but a
domesic as well.
Summary
This chapbr demonstrated the ways in which Great Briain successfully presented
messages laden with themes and values with $'hich its Amcrican ardierrce could identif with.
Through the presentation ofthese messages, and the repetition ofthe values and themes within
them allowed the two counfies to become "substantially one" (Brrte, 1969, p. 2I). Following
the passage ofthe lend-lease bill 1941, Britain used the transcendent'we' to seize upon
America's offer of aid and perpetuate an Anglo-American alliarrce.
Britain atso used identification as a means to dissociarc itself an4 in turn, America" from
Germany, allowing for the creation of a common arrny and a common thr€at to the rialues a[d
beliefs held by Britain and the U.S.
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Chapter V: Fact, Consistency, aDd the Transcendent Value
The Narrative Paradi gttt
Fisher's (1989) Ilznan Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason,
Value and Action poposes wtrat the author refeG to as the'hanative paradigEl." Central to
Fisher's theory is the assumpion tha *humans are storyt€llers" (p. 5) who perceive life as a
series of"narratives, conflicts, characters, beginnings and endrngs" (p. 24). We must perpenully
attempt to evaluab and choose from these stories so that we can 'live life in a process of
continual re-creation" (p. 5).
It is imporEnt to un&rstand that Fisher's (19E9) &finition of a narrative is not limited to
conventional 'stories- bgt may incorporate'any kind of discourse" (p. 86) or words and deeds
(Rowland, l9E9). According to Rowland Fisher's broad definition would allow anything from
Darwin's Oigin of the Hutun Species andEitrshil's Relativity: The Special and General
Theory ta a presidential address or a popular film to be interpraed by the nanative paradigm.
The narr*ive par,adigm provides an alternalive to the rational world paradign in two
important regards. First, rmlike the rational norld paradign that contends humans are reasoning
animals, the nanative paradigrn suggests that *humans are as much valuing animals as they are
reasoning"(Fisher, 19t9, p. 5E). Secondly, whereas the rational world paradigttt prescribes
argumentation as the paradignatic mode of decision making the narrative paradigrr conrcnds
that decisions are made througlt the application ofa "logic of good reasons'(p'57) that are
innately applied to the test the narrative fidelity of a story.
. 
The Lnsic ofGood Reasons. ln an effort to choose betrveen an anay ofoften conflicting
stories, audierm corrinually apply a'logic of good r€8sons" to establish the narrative Iidelity of
a story. Fisher (19E9) sets forth five elements, or dimensions, to his logic of good rcasons: First
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fact: What are tlrc values, both implicit and srplicit, contained within the message? Sccond,
relevance: Are the values presented approgiate for the decision being sought? ltrave relevant
facts been omitrcd or distorted? Thir4 consequences: What effec8 arc likely to result if the
audience acted on the advice of thc message? Fourth, consistency: Are tlrc values prescnted
consistent with the personal experierrces ofthe audicnce? Fiflt, transcendem values: Fisher
rcfers to transcendefit values as those of "ultimate valw.. . generally taken for granted by the
arguer, but when brought to the surface they reveal one's most frrndamental commitmen$"
(p.loe).
The logic ofgood reasons is intendcd to be "less narrowly constructed" (Fisher' l9E9' p.
t07) than simply *good reasons." Rather than viewing a good reason as a ststement that
supports an ought statem€o! tl16 logic of gimd reasons views thern as 'those elenrenS that
provide warrants for acceping or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication
that can be considered rlretorical" (p.107). Additionally, Fisher contends that the test ofnarrdive
fidelity through the application ofthe logic ofgood reasons is one that does not have to be
leamed. Rather, the testing of narrative fidelity is an innate process acquiled through experience.
It is, then, a natural process.
British Propoganda and the logic ofGood Reasons
The applicdion of the logic of good reasons to British pmpaganda in the Unitcd States is
both ap,propriate and useful for several reasons. First, Fisho (1989) suggess that the logic of
good reasons is best used in matters of public moral arguments or debates. Such discourse deals
with matters of life and death and are publicized and available for wide consumption to
*unhained thinken'(p. 71). This lay audience consists of*active inepressible
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participants"(p.72) who instinctually test the narative fidelity ofthese competitrg stories.
Clearly, British propaganda meeb these criteria.
If wE assume that "people have a natural tendency to prefer what they perc€ive to be true
and jus (Fisher, l98t p. 7l), the process of isolating weighing ard comrasting ttrc dimensions
ofthe logic ofgood reasons will provide a means of undentanding why American audiences
prefened the British story.
Method
This chapter will explore three ofthe five dimensions ofthe logic of good reasons: fact,
transcendent value, and consistency with the rernaining dimensions, conseqrrnce and relevance
to be dealt with in the following chapter. This approach will allow for the valuedriven and
logical dimensions of the logic of good reasons to be segregated and oramined mole fully. As in
the previous chapter, materials have been examined for the presence ofthe primary themes ofthe
people's war democracy, stiength and couragg civilization, Christianity and class equalrty
(Brewer, 197; Cull, 1993, 1995, 1997; Graves, t 95 l ; Taylor, 1990). I{arcrials were then
examined for the presence of both implicit and explicit values. Ofteq the specified themes also
serve as values; however, attertion has also been given to the preserrce of additional values.
Once the presence ofvalues has been identified, attention will be given to the role they
play. Values within these materials typically serve one or more of the following purposes. Fint,
they may address criticisms or misconoeptions of Britain by American audiences. Valles also
provide motives or reasons for an implied or stated action. Values are also employed to justi$
Britain's uar efforts or change American perceptions of the uar. Finally, as uas demonstrafied
throughout chapter 4, Britain also relies upon the use ofvalues to establish the presence of
sharpd substance with iB American audience.
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Phase I: Introducing Britairu March 1939 to April 1940
Democracy
Britain ToDav Throughout the first phase of Britain's propaganda in the United Ststes,
democracy was often presented as a source ofother values, or reasons. This approach can be
seen in "Democracy in a Changing World" in which derncracy uas shovm to be responsible for
the values of 'liberty and... free speoch, freedom of the press, freedom of public meeting and
association" ( I 939, p. 3). Similarly, "Briain and the Nerlrals" ( I 939) offered democracl as the
source of "independerce and freedom" (p. l). Democracy was also shown to provide "security"
("The tught to Gnrnble, 1939, P-I)
Once danocracy uas esbblished as the sornce of othcr values, it uEs pressrted as a
responsibility. "Democracy in a Changing World" (1939) suggestcd that those who have
benefitted fiom democracy and the liberty and freedoms that accompany it must defcnd it agains
those wtro decry its virtues. In this particular insance it was suggested that this defense can be
accomplished by simply rernaining faithftrl to dernocratic principles, a rather vague notion the
article fails to fully elaborate.
However, in both *Britain and the Neunals" ( I 939) and *Britain in Europe" ( I 939) the
responsibility ofthe democratic natitin was more clearly defined. Each ofthese pieces
contended that defending dernocracy required taking an active role in global events. We are told
that the British democracy cannot " dissociate herself from Europe" ("Britain in Europe," 1939,
p. 2). "Britain and the Neutrals" contended that, while neural nations have the right to remain
neutral, they also had a'responsibiliV' 6. 2) not to help the totalitarian regime threatening
British democracy. This responsibility uas reinforced by the fact that Britain is "fighting for all
free nations" (1939, p. l).
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Phase I: Introducing BriairL lvlarch 1939 to April 1940
Democracv
Briain To-Dav Tkoughout the first phase of Briain's propaganda in ttp United Sates,
democmcy was often presented as a source ofother values, or reasons. This approach can be
seen in "Democracy in a Changing World" in which democracy was shown to be responsible for
the values of 'liberty and. . . free speecll freedom of the press, freedom of public meeting and
association" (1939, p. 3). Similarly, "Briain and the Neutrals" (1939) ofrered dcmocncy as the
source of "independence and freedom" (p. l). Dernocracy uas also shown to provide "security"
("The Right to Grumble, 1939, p.l)
Once democracy u.as established as the source ofother values, it was presented as a
rcsponsibility. "Democracy in a Changing World" (1939) suggested that those who have
benefitted from democracy and the liberry and freedoms that accompany it mus defend it against
those who decry its virtues. In this particular instance it was suggested that this defense can be
accomplished by simply remaining faithfrrl to democratic principles, a rather vague notion the
article frils to fully elaborate.
However, in both 'Britain and the Neutrals" (1939) and "Britain in Europe" (1939) the
responsibility ofthe democratic nation was more clcarly defined. Each ofthese pieces
contended that defending democracy required taking an active role in global events. We are told
that the British demodacy cannot " dissociare herself from Europe" ('Briain in Europe ," 1939 ,
p. 2). "Briain and the Neutrals" contended ttnt while neutral nations have the right to remain
neutral, they also had a "responsibiliry" (p. 2) not to help the totalitarian regime threatening
British democracy. This responsibility uas reinforced by ttre fact that Britain is "fighting for all
free nations ' ( 1939, p. l).
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The rea&r was shown that democrary fosters other values and tbat these values carry
with them responsibilities. A reader who has accepted these claims was also able to accept that
Britain is fighting to defend democracy and that nertrality and isolationism are conrary to the
purposes ofdemocracy .
Streneth and Couraqe
Edward R. Murrow Murrow's broadcasts drring this phase of British propaganda
typically provided listenen with exarnples that suggested a British people who are strong
courageous and dctermined to fight for their country. Examples ofthese values were typically
seen in the form of either military sfen$h or personal str€ngth- Occasionally these approaches
were combined as Murrow reports on the valor of individuals in the miliary.
As the sinution in Europe worsend Munow reported that Britons "arc amazingly calm,
they still employ understatement and they are inclined to discuss the prospocts of war with oh, a
casual 'bad show' or'ifthis is peace give me a good war"'(Murrow, 1941, p. a). Murrow
added, " I have heard no one say... 'I hope Mister Chamberlain can find a uay out" (p.4).
By September3, 1939, Britain declarred war on Germany. Murmw (1941) reported that
"the crowds... greeted the news with a rousing cheer" (p.18). Even the imminent fall of France
was incapable of'creating any panic" but rathcr created a sense of*urgency" (p.102).
During the "phony war" the opporhmities to present Briain's military strength were
limited. However, Munow's considerable acces to the military sources and sites (cull, 1993,
1995) allowed him to provide his listenen with insight into Britain,s miliary efforts. For
example, on Novembr 27, 1939, he reported on the "first naval activity of this rmr- (Munow,
1941, p- 44). Although the German attack on the British merchant ship Raualpindi ended in the
sinking of the British vessel, Murrow's description of the encounEr provided at least a glimpse
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of British heroism. The Rawalpindi is confronted by not one, but two German vessels of
significantly larger size. Despite being outnumbered, the ship continwd to fight for nearly an
hour until its last gun was shot out. Evenfirally all ofthose on board went down with the burning
vessel (Murrow, l94l).
The Rawalpindi aside, Britain had enormous faith in its nary. On April t, 1940 Munow
reported that Britain uas prepared for a German attack. Noting that the attack might not be the
much talked about Blitzlaieg he added that the'Sitzlcieg" (1941, p. 79) had come to an end.
Rather than upaetting the British people, the threat ofatack was greeM with conlidence. 'No
one is particularly wonied about this new phase of the war. It's a job for the Navy and the
confidence of tlre British in their Navy is supreme" (p.79).
Within this conrcxt the role of strength and couragE as values served more to paint Briain
and the British people in a positive light than to provide a clear call to action as the value of
democracy did. Murrow's audience heard of a people who had the courage to fight for their
country, a value that most Americans would likely have shared had they faced a similar tkeat.
Civilization
Britain To-Dav. Civilization was most typically prcsentedby Brilain To-Day tbrott$t
symbols ofother values. For example, 'The English Way of Life" (1939) focused on several
symbols of British civilization. Each symbol provided the reader with additional values. The
reader was intoduced to Oxford, the symbol ofeducation, Canterbury, a symbol ofreligio[ and
Parliament, the symbol ofdemocratic liberties. Just as democracy had produced a range of
equally appea.ling values, so, too had British civilization. However, it is intercsting to note that
while democratic liberties are offered as value produced by British civitization, we are later
reminded these values were the result of a "&mocratic civilization', ( I 939 , p.2). Here again we
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find an attempt to provided a reason to support Britain. The reader who valued educatiorg
religion, or democracy was able to find inherent worth in Britain.
"Arms and the lvlan" (1939) also pres€nts a dcmocratic civilization tbat took grest pains
to preserve peaoe and will only resorted to force whcn that civilization and its people were
tlueaEned In this instance, thc article began what will be an ongoing effort to address Britain's
attempts at appeasemem with Germany under the Chamberlain govemment. These early efforts
to placate Germany and avoid war became a source ofcontinucd criticism for Britain throughout
the years leading up to the United States' erfrance into &e war (Hart, 1970). As we see in the
phase of British propaganda, Britain frequently attempted to jusify its reluctsnce to oppose
Germany.
Christianitv
Britain To-fhy. Although the role of Christianity is limite4 its presence served as
another means to contrast England with Germany and to illustrate other values held by the
English people. "The English Christrnas" (1939) not only supplied reade$ with the value of
Christianity but also prescnted it as the source of*family'' and "fellowship" (p.l ). Howcver,
more important was the implicit suggestion that these values urcrc afforded to England because it
is a land with religious freedoms that would not be found under a totalitarian rcgime.
Phase II: Briain Takes It and Carries ort (May to Decembo 1940)
Democracy
Britain To-Dav. Ashley (1940) offered readers a behind the scenes look at the taining
and routines of British soldiers. *The Britistr Army from Mthin" brought together the thernes of
democracy and strength. The latter wil be discussed betow. The articre marked the first of
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msny instances in which democracy w:ls overtly offered as a cause wonh fighting for. Ashley
explained that the painful transition from civilian life was made worthwhile for the young British
soldier by the knowledge that he uas fighting for both "the comer of Brir^in that is his home"
and the "dernocratic principle upon which the British Commonwealth is built" (p. l5). Thus we
see the British soldier p,reparing to fight for the values of demooary and home; the only thing
apparently left out by Ashley in his attemp to appeal to American readers was apple pie.
The value ofdemocrary was also shown to foster ingenuity and determination as
exemplified in Brown's (1940) "War and Rural Britain." Here we see the "democratic way"
enabling defense volunteers to accomptish the "impossible" (p.2). The value ofdemocracy also
united a community as "everybody" (p.2) worked for the same goal - the defense ofdernocracy.
Briain Soeaks. Priestley's July I I , I 940, broadcast once apin offered democracy as the
source of other values, inctuding fieedom. Priestley juXaposed the fiee British soci*y against
that of totalitarian Cemrany. The approach allowed him to refute German pmpaganda while
simultaneously highlighting the fteedoms thar dernocratic Briain has produced. Priestley told
listeners that Germany. was claiming newspapers in England are to be abolished and that
criticizing the British govemment was punishable by deportation. HowEver, listeners were told
such "comic fairy tales" (Priestley, 1940, p. 98) werc contrary to everghing that British
dernocracy stands for.
In addition to providing the people of England with "liberties" (Priestley, !,9al,p.l26)
democracy has also fosteled a "sense ofcommunity" (p.126). Indeed, it was the very need to
preserve the liberties afrorded by democracy that brought the people ofEngland together.to
destroy fte Nazis but also to build up a far nobler Britain than the world has yet seen', (p. 126).
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War was not only justified, it uas a means of producing positive values including nobility and
stronger communities.
Streneth and Courage
Britain To-Dav. As previously mentione4 *The British Army fiom Within" (Ashley,
1940) stresses the themes ofboth democracy and strength. ttraving esablished that the British
soldier was fighting for both his hometown and the dernocratic principles ofEngland, the anicle
also documented the sacrifices rcquired of the soldier. Not only did he leave his home for less
comfortable settings and less palarable food" he also engaged in strenuous physical training.
The citizens of England were just as willing as its soldieas to sacrifrce for their country.
This was seen in both'The Will to Viaory" (1940) and "The Battle of l,ondon" (1940). In both
articles, the srength of the British people was attriburcd to their "morale" ('The Will to
Victory" 1940, p. 2) and "daermination" ("The Battle of London," 1940, p. 2) which were
fostered by the'tesources" (*The Will to Victory, 19'10, p. 2) of dem(rctacy.
Edward R. Murrow. By May 1940, German forces were moving through Belgium,
Luxernbourg; and the Netherlands (thrt, 1970). However, as their European neighbors fell,
Murrow (1941) reported that " Briain is pledged to victory, victory at all costs" (p. 98) even
though tlrey would likely need to spend the coming months simply avoiding defeat. Munow also
noted thd there is "no tendency to underrate the difficulties or create hopes ofan early or eariy
victory" (p.9E).
Munow was firequently given access to the British military as well as scenes of banle ttrat
were denied the British press (cull, 1993, 195). This was rhe case on June 2, 1940, wtren
Murrow was given access to members of the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) who urould eventually
serve as Britain's first line of defense in the southeast coast Munow, t94l). Murrow described
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the casual way in which the "boys" (p.122) discussed their last battle against German forces.
While he said that ttrcy showed'ho nerves'(p. 122), the gravity of the sioation uas clearly
reflected as the convenation tumed to the loss of British life that day. The piece also illustrates
the obstacles the R.A.F. faced esainst substantially larger German forces. On this day, Murrow
reported that six British fighten were confrorted with twelve Gcrman. Such facts could only
help to make the confident British seern all the more couragsous and admirable in this David
versus Goliath scenario.
Although Murrow's broadcasts reflected the objectivity that had allowed him to be scen
as a credible observer, he did occasionally ofrer his opinions on both the war in general and
Britain's efforts. In his July 21, 1940 broadcast, for er.ample, Murrow (1941) offercd his
asscssment of Briain by saying they possess, " the necessary unity, determiutiorL fervor an4 if
you will, fanaticism" (p. 135) to penevere in what is destined to be a long fight. Such comments
prwided an invaluable counter to the claims of some in the U.S. that Briain had neither the will
nor the strength to succeed in their battle against Germany (Cull, 1995; Hart, 1970). As
mentioned in chaper 4, Munow allowed ttE U.S. listener to 'txperience" the war in Britain in
their own living rooms and to hear of Britain's plight from an American voice. His depiction of
the values held by Britons might not have provided Americans with a motive for actiorl but it
helped to establish a reason for choosing the British story.
Britain sDeaks. Priestley's (1940) heroes were most often "the average maq the man on
the street" (p. 26) wlro dedicaled themselves to volunteer wort after a firll day at their job. Such
was the case in Priestley June 14, 1940, broadcast when he took the listener along to a night
watch with the local defense volunteers. The men whojoined priesttey at the sentry post werc
farmers and laborers. These men came even though *the odds are likely to be against them,,
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(1940, p. 27) because they could not face the exasperation of civilian life. They were a people
"wlro are, whatever their faults, pcychologically tougher and more rcsourceful thsn the Germans"
(p.35). Without ever using the word courage Priestly provided a simple porhait of it.
Similarly, 'the ordinary folk of Britain" (Priestley, 19,10, p. 169) were *the people who
stand out from this dart welter of cowardice, treachery and panic like a Gbraltaf (p.169). Ttrc
courage ofthese peoplg we arc told, was'lnagnifioently high'(p. 170). This uas illustrated by
a maid who announce4 '?lease, madam 
- 
bombs ' (p.170) to lrr employer 8t the start of an air
raid or the mother who had to order her dauglrter to put down her book and pay attention to th€
air raid. However ooggsrated these oomples may be, they managcd to pr€sent the strength of
the British conviction and the calm tha accompanies it.
Civilization
Britain Soeaks. In the previous phase it was noted that Brttain To-Day rM its depiction
ofthe value of civilization to contend with criticisms lodged at Britain for iB efforB to appease
Germany under the Chamberlain Government. Priestley ( 1940) frequently took a similar
approach. "lt takes an awful lot to rouse the ordinary English folk. They're apt to be easy,
sleepy, good natured crowd, but once they'rc roused... they'll wade in and never stoy''(p. I l).
Civilization in Britain meant that tlrc "tolerance" ofthe British 'democracy" (p.47) mandated
they not rush into war. But this tolerance and good humor (Priestley, 19,10) provided the Nazis
with'superb opportunhies" (p. 67). The evil Germans had taken quick advantage ofthe genuine
goodness that civilization had created.
Priestley not only depicted a civilization that is domimted by decency, but also addressed
the slowness of Britain's response to the Nazi threat At the same timg he managed to address
u.s. isolationists as he spoke of those that are slow to rouse. priestley employed this techniqra
often. For exampre, on one occasion priestrey (1940) criticized the nay in which some ofhis
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countrymen had slowed the preparations for war because they believed they lived on a "magic
island" (p. 5) and th8t' disasters and tragedies, fire and slaughter, reachery and inrrasions, are
things that only happen over the seas" (p. I I ). The strtement served as an indirect jab at U. S.
isolationists, who clearly share these views,
Class Equlitv
Britain Speaks. The value ofequlity was seen most often within Priestley's scripts as
one that Britain must still strive to obtain. Priestley (1940) conceded that "tlp divisions benreen
classes 
- 
always England's weakness," but then explained that the uar was changing things and
that the divisions are being'rubbed out" (p.127). He p,redicted that "somahing grand" will
come out of it all and adde4 *if it doesn'! tlren we deserve all tha we gst" (p. I 27).
The changes that war has brought to the class divisions were elaborated upon by Priestley
and other soupes in the rrxt phase of British propaganda. However, rve can already see the
technique that is being employed. Firs! by acknowledging the problem, Priestley and other
propagandists were able to bolster their credibility. Secondly, they demonstrated th€ value of
equality as one they appreciate4 and strove to achieve. Finally, by presenting the war as at leas
a partial answer to inequality they provided a reason for an America that rias itself facing the
problerns of inequality (Goodwin, 1994) with one less reason to fear war.
Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December l94l)
Democracv
Britain To-Dav. Dernocracy continued to be presented as the source of liberty, freedom
and independence @arker, l94l; *Briain and America," l94l; *The New year,- l94l).
However, Roosevelt's pledge ofu.S. assistance brought several changes. Firs! democracy uas
now even 'stronger"(*Tlre New year, t % t, p. 2) thanks to the alliance betu/een the two great
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democracies. Although America had pledged only financial and material assistance, they were
joined with Britain for the continued "wolution" @arter, 1941, p. 2) and beterment of
democracy.
Jus has democracy produced fieedom, libeny and independence, we now learn that it
was responsible for producing fierdshiy'' ('The New Yar," 1941, p. I ) and "goodwill"
("Britain and America," 1941, p. l). The friendship, bom ofdemocracy, could supercede
"hesitation, distrus! hint-heartedness" (p.l) as ia'ideals are converted into action" (p.2). This
friendship, based on "a common view of life and shared vales" ('Britain and America," I 94 I , p-
3) were directed at a gotnmon caus€ as *tlre British cause is the American cause" (*Britain and
Americ4 l%l,p.l).
Streneth and Couraqe
Butlains from Britain. During the previous phases of Briti* pmpagandq srength and
courage were frequemty illusfated by the willingness ofthe British people to sacrifice for tlrc
war effort. Britons were depicted as suffering great material losses throughout the Battle of
Britain and the Blita but tlrcy responded with courage and confidence. llaving shown their
American audience the peril oftlreir situation, their approach changes. The sacrifices ofthe
British people are presented in a more liglrt-hearted manrrcr, as was dernonstrated by the columns
of Marion Slater (1941) discussed in chapter 4. These featurps allowed sacrifice to be seen more
as a nuisance that can be solved through ingenuity. The approach allowed the British people to
rcmain in a sympathetic light with Americans, while not appearing to face such odds so as to
render them a lost cause.
Meanwhilq the value of strength uas illustrated most frequently in the form of military
strength and heroism. orre example of this can be found in the *In the Fighting Line" column
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that appears regularly in Bulletins from Britain. Comising of a series of short pieces, tlre
column provided readers with nevra of British victories and German defeats. "Ferrying the
Planes" (1941) described the activities of the Air Transport Auxiliary (AT.A) that is responsible
for aking aircraft from the manufacnring plant to tlrc airfield- The individuals in the A.T.A.
came from 'every ualk of IiG ' and piloted crafls through 'skies thick with enemy aircraff' and
"through every type ofurcather" (p. 5).
Similarly, "Britain's Night Fighters" (1941) provided readers with updares on the latest in
military technolory, the "Cat's Eyes," a high+ndurance, twin<ngine aircraft that that dlowed
the R.A.F. fighter to become 'tnaster of the dark skies of night" (p. 4). The article gloried in the
"fire of death that comes spurting without a word's wamingl' (p.4) at the German enemies.
Not only did these acoounts stress present military stength and heroism as enviable
battles to its audience; they werc placed amid articles empbasized the values ofdemocracy,
education, religious freedom, and personal sacrifice. Subsequently, the value ofmiliary stnenglh
was placed within the context ofthe values that motivate it.
Christianiw
Briain ToDav. Throughout this examination of values in British propagand4 we have
seen democracy as a sowce for other values including freedom, liberty and independence. In
Barker's (1941) "The Progress of British Democracy" we ar€ told that religion was the source of
democracy. According to Barker, " it uas by the uray of religion, of religious experienco, of
religious thought... that the English people came to the practice of... democracy', (p.5).
Democracy was been produced by faith an4 in turn, produced it.
Bulletins from Briain. Religion and democracy were similarly paired in both .. pm an
End to This Terrorism!" and "Hitler Insults the Muslims." Although the latter of these pieccs did
70
Hcth.ri!8on: The Peoplc's Wa,
not pertain specifically to Christianity, along with the former it did stress the value of religious
freedom. According to'Hitler Insults the Muslims," Nazism uas scomful of all religion
'Christianity and Islam alike" (Schacht, 1941, p. 6). Both picces attempted to illustrate that the
religious freedom provided by democracy would be non<xistent und€r a tolention r€gime.
Class and Eouality
Britain TcDav. As we have seen before, Briain continrrcd to deal with the problem of
inequality by demonstrating the progress they were making in achieving it. The pursuit of
equality is, again, helpod by the nar, as is demonstsated by "Londoners in the Country" which
described the strift in social divisions brought by the communal living of tlre evacuees. Although
these evacuees u,Ere brought togaher from disparate backgrounds and under the worst of
conditions the article suggested that the playing field was leveled resulting in a sense of
commrmity between the poor cormtry peasant and the morc afrluent city dweller ("Londoners in
the Country," l94l).
Briain Speaks. Priestley also made use of the evacuee hostels to suggest that war had
brought England closer to social equality. Priestley often spoke of the goings on at one of his
country houses that uas converted into a hostel for women and children. Here, "women and
children from very different backgrounds" including the 'intensely respectable suburban to the
dockside slums" lived and worked together. Priestley suggested that this new communal living
helped to create a "social revolution" (Priestley, 1941, Janrory 26) that will mostly benefit the
children who will grow up free ofthe classism that had plagued England.
Bulletins from Britain. War's ability to foster equality uas presented again in a variety of
short pieces in Eulletins from Britain including ' A visit to a Day Nursery,' ( t 941). Again,
children from all classes were placed together in a nurturing environment while their mothers,
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who are, of cours€, also from vastly ditrerent backgrounds, did their part for the war effort. This
and other pieces like it suggested that war accomplished wlnt years of attempns at social reform
could not by bringing all of England's citizens together for a common goal reprdless of their
socioeconomic background-
The Transcendent Issue Dimension
According to Fisher (1989), transcendent issues are those of ultimarc value. Such issues
are of paramount importance that impinges on the "mture, tlre quality and continued existence of
human life" (p. 109). These issues are ofren'"taken for granted by the arguer, but whcn brought
to the surface, ttrcy reveal one's most fundamental commitments" (p. 109). In the case ofBritish
propaganda in the United Stares, democracy clearly emergod as the bansoendent issue.
The role ofdeinocracy throughout Briain's propoganda campaigrr is ubiquitous.
Dernocracy was the source for other values including freedom, liberty and independence (Barker,
1941; 'tsritain and Americg" l94l; "Britain in Europe," 1939; "Briain and the Neutrals," 1939;
"Democracy in a Changing World," 1939; 'The New Year," l94l; Priestley, 1940,). In the final
phase of Britain's efforts in the U.S. dernocracy was the source of "friendship" ('The New
Year," 1941, p.l) and *goodwill" ("Britain and Americ4' 1941, p. l) as a means to reinforce and
perpetuate of the Anglo-American alliance.
Strength and courage were also direct descendants of dem@racy. The British soldier and
the British people were fighting to preserve dcmocmcy and all that it has provided thun. It was
democracy that gave the British soldier the motivation to leavc home and train sfenuously to
defe,nd his counry (Ashley, 1940). lt provided the motivation for the British people join
togpther across class lines to accomplish the'impossible- @rown, 1940, p'2) and withstand
rmbearable circumstances.
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Though it is not derived from Christianity, democracy has provided religious freedom
that has allowed it, and other religions, to flourish ('The English Chrisffias," 1939; Dormey,
l94l; Schacht, l94l). Democracy was also shown to be a direct product of, if not Christianity,
then religion (Barter, l94l).
Dernocracy was also intenvoven into the very fabric ofcivilization. It govemed the
actions of British civilization, causing it to exercise tolerance before entering into a state ofwar
('Briain and Europe," 1939) and provided the motive for emering into that war (Priestley,
1940). Indee4 democmcy would make England worth protecting ('Arms and the lvlaq" 1939).
Clearly, the invocation ofdemocracy was not accidental. In their effort to persuade the
United States that their cause wrs worth supporting Britain relied upon the comerstone of
American civilization. The importance of &rnocracy in Ore United States uas indisputable and
Britain's use of democracy ultimately means "the British cause is the American ceuse" ("Britain
and America, 19a1, p. l).
Consistency
Fisher (1989) suggestcd that in applying the test of narrafive fidelity, audiences seek to
determine whetlrer the values presented to them arc conlirmed or validared either by their ovm
expericrrces or the experiences ofthos€ they know. The consistency ofthe values presented by
Britain with those held by its u.S. audience was dernonstrated in thr€c ways. First, as was
shown in Chaper 4, Britain provided is American audience with values they could identi& with.
Second, Britain presentcd values that could address the criticisms ofAmericans. Finally, the
consistency ofthe values presented within British p,ropagan& helped to show Germany as a
clear enerny whose values were not consistent with tlrose of Britain and America.
ITHACA COLTEGE TBRARY
fktlEington: Th. Poplc's Wlr
As has been discusse4 democracy served as the tanscendent issue within Britain's
messagcs to the United Stat€s. In presenting itself as a democracy Britain carefully crafted is
message to reflect the values that are embodied in American dernocracy. Democracy in Britain
consisted of freedom ofthe prcss and public meeting liberty and independence (Barker, l94l;
"Britain and America," l94l; 'Britain in Europe," 1939; 'Britain and the Neutrals," 1939;
"Democracy in a Changing World," 1939; *The New Year," l94l; Priestley, 1940). In making
this argumen! Briain appealed to the very values that made Americans Americans.
American audiences were also offercd a depiction of British civilization comprised of an
anay of values including culture, educatiorl hard work and deoency. Such values are
sufficiently broad to appeal to many different danognphics groups without tk€atening to
alienate anyone.
As has been noted, Britain also portayed itselfas possessing values that Americans had
criticized it for lacking. This was particularly true ofclurges ttrat Britain was not strong enough
to maintain a prolonged war effort or lacked the will to see the war through to completion
@rumbaclq 1941; Cole, 1953, 1974; Cull, 1995; Stenehjem, 1976). Briain was able to show
itself as willing to $,ithstand the horror of the Blitz and the sacrifice inhercnt with war in order to
defend itself.
Similarly, Britain was able to show its American audienc€ that it recognized the value of
equality as one that it was seeking to achieve. Despirc the fact "class division" had been
"England's rveakness" (Priestley, l%0, p. 127) Britain was now embracing the erosion of class
divisions brought by the war.
The consisterrcy ofthe values presented by Britain with those of its U.S. audience also
allowed Germany to be depicted effcctively as a common enany. As uas seen in the
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examination ofidentification through dissociatiorl Britain portayed Germany as being devoid of
the values shared by themselves and the United States. While Britain and the United States
were democratic nations who valued freedornand liberty ('Democracy in a Changing World,"
1939), Germany was totalitarian. Briain was on the side of God (Priestley, l%0) while
Germany was oppod to religious freedom and planning to replace the cross with the swastika
('The Cross Will Disappear," 1941; Dovmey, l94l).
Throughout the period of 1939 and 1941, Americaos were presented with values that
wele consistent with their ovvn. This consistency, combined with the repetition of these values
through a variety of media, allowed the British war efrort to be seen as wortlry of American
support because it uas being fought to defend American values.
Conclusions
Britain's use ofvalues in its efforts to gain Amedcan sympethy, support and assistance
served several purposes. Not only had values established Britain as a democratic nation fighting
for the very ideals upon wtrich the United States was figlrting for, they trelped to address
misconcepions about Britain and show Britain to be a worthy ally.
Those who believed that Britain'did not have the slightest conception ofdernocracy"
(Lavine, 19,10, p. 119) were rebuffed by Britain's presentation of itself as a nation committed to
dernocracy, freedom and liberty. Similarly, questions ofBritain's ability to withstand a
prolonged war effort were ad&cscd by repearcd examples of Britain's strength and miliAry
prowess even in the face of insurmountable obstacles. This view was reinforced by the
broadcasts of Edward R Munow wtro had himself doubted Britain's strengt[ only to be
convinced by his firsthand experiences (Cull, 1993, 1995; Penico' t988).
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Americans who rvere wary of war were shown that, in spite ofthe horrors, war could
produce profound and positive changes. War could not only promote social cohesion but could
also help bring about social and economic reform. This was a sigrrificent message for an
audience that is still feeling the effects of ttre Depression and the disparity that acpompanied it.
Perhap most importantly, within the thernes of tlr Peopte's war, Britain expressed a
broad range of values thst could appeal to an American audience on a nrrnber of levels. These
values appeared both cxpticitly and implicitly throughout the years of 1939 and l%1, providing
a positive image ofBritain to be create4 reinforced and mainhined. Just as was seen in the
discussion of idcntification, Briain's use ofvalue cannot be viewed in terms ofa single piece of
rhetoric or grand oratory, but rather as a body of values from which Americans could chose.
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Chapter VI: Consequence and Relevance
In chapter 5, the fact, transcendent issue, and consisterrcy dimensions ofFisher's (1989)
logic of good reasons werc addressed The exploration ofthese dimeusions revealed that Britain
relied upon the transcendent issue ofdernocracy along with other values consistent with those
held by iB American audience to present its message efectively. This chapter will continue the
application ofFisher's concept ofa logic of good reasons, examining the dimensions of
consequence and relevance.
Method of Analysis
As in previous chapters, materids bave been examined for the presence ofthe primary
thernes ofthe people's war: democracy, strength and courage, civilization, Chdstianity, and class
equalrty. Materials were then examined to &termined what consequences were suggested by the
messages and wfiether the messages offered were releva[t to the competing story - that ofthe
isolationisB.
In examining consequences, several questions will be posed. What are the implicit and
explicit consequences offered by BriAin should the U.S, povide assistance to the war effort?
What does Britain suggcst the consequences will be ifthe U.S. fails to provide aid? Beyond
those consequences offcred by Britain, what other consequerrces can be inferrei? For example,
in its attempts to portray itself as strong and courageous, Britain also rcminded its American
audience ofthe death a[d destuction that accompanied war. Such neptive cons€quences plsyed
a sigrificant role in America's evaluation of Briain's story.
Because the possible consequences ofu.s. assistance to Britain werc pivotal to the
isolationist arggmen! the dimensions ofconsequerrce and relevance will be addressed conjointly'
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In addition to considering the consequerces of U.S. ai4 the discussion of relevance will ask how
Britain addresscd the other major points ofthe isolationist argument.
Phase I: Phase I: Intoducing Britain (lvlarch 1939 to April 1940)
Dernocracv
As we have seen, democracy provided a powerful means of identi$ing with American
audiences while also serving as the ranscendent valuc ofBritish propagnda. The depiction of
Britsin as a democratic nation also served to refute isolationist claims that Britain was "not
fighting for democracy" (Stenehjem, 1976, p. 20) and that America should 'not be fooled into
thinking...liberty, democmcy or progress" (p. 19) uas ir cause. Moreover, Britain needed to
demonstrale a real threat to democracy that isolationism and nerlrality could not addrcss.
Britain ToDav. Britain To-Day lost no time in addressing isolationist charges that
Britain was not a democrary. The publication's premier issue began with 'Democracy in a
Changing World," noting that Britain was proud to "best thar she is a dernocracy with a
tradition of free institutions and of or&red change" (1939, p. 2). As it continued to stess the
beliefs in "liberty... the righb of free speech, freedom of the press and Mom of public
meetings and associatiorL" (p. 2) it displayed an understanding ofdemocracy that is synchronous
with America's.
In addition to using the U.S. Constitution to define British dcrnocracy ard the role it
played in the lives ofBritons, the article also attempted to ad&ess the notion of isolationism
itself. The piece contended that the govemmems of democracies must safeguard the dernocracy
and the privileges it has afrorded its citizens. However, the means tha should be used to defend
democracy were never articulad. The American isolationist could argue, as they di4 that the
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best defense for American dernocracy was remaining uninvolved in European affairs (Cole,
1953, 1974: Stenehjem, 1975).
"Britain and Europe" suggested that the freedom of prress provided by democracy would
also provide its citizens with the news and information that rvould force them to confront the
threat to their democracy. The article suggested that, just as Britain could no longer "dissociate
herselffrom Europe" (1939, p.2) thanks to tlre information given by the BBC, a free flow of
information would force Americans to abondon their isolationist sance.
The importance ofthe freedom ofpress was also emphasizrd in "A Test ofNerves."
Howwer, in this ins&nce it lvas offered as one of the privileges that could be lost in a norld
indifferent to Germany totalitarianism. In the face of German teachery it was only those who
recogrized the threat and "adap thernselves to the frcts who will bes sand the strain" (1939, p.
I). And while "there may be some who would prefer not to know the worst and object to any
disturbance oftheir peace," (p. 3) the protection of democracy hinged upon hcing one's feani.
Although the article never mentioned America by name, the inference was as unmistakable as
the message: isolationism, not interventionism, was the real tkeat to democracy.
The message was reiterated immediarcly following Britain's declaration of war.
Although Britain, like America, had been reluctant to enter the nar, 'tlrere is no better answer"
@ritain at War, 1939, p. I ). The *avcrage Englishman" (p. I ) had chosen not to 'dwell in
twilight" (p. I ) but instcad decided to "embark on wtat he knew to be a long and tremendous
struggle '{p. 2). The article clearly sought to imply that Americans uould be condemned to
dwelling in the nrilight as long as tlrey choose to maimain their isolationist stsnce.
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Strength and'Courage
Throughout the war, Britain walked a tighttiope in its depiaion ofthe srength and
courage of the British people and military. While oa one hand there was a rped to address
charges that Britain "had neither the spirit or ability needed for a modem war" (Cole, 1970, p.
26), on the other han4 Briain bad to proceed with caution knowing that too dramatic a
presentation ofthe honors of war and the stength needed to cope would only further the
isolationist argument that by remaining out of war the U.S. could be sparcd the devasAtion that
accompanied it (Page, 1939).
Edward R. Murrow. As we have seen in prrevious chapters, Britain uas limited in is
ability to project the strength and courage of its citizens and military during the relative calm of
the first phase of British propaganda. However, Murrow's broadcasts provided listeners with
insight into Britain's preparations for war, and their willingness to make needed sacrifices. He
also brought the seriousness ofthe situation facing Britons home to Ameriosns.
Such was the case on August 31, l939,just days before Britain's declaration of war.
Murrow described plaos to wacuate 650,00 of 'lhe children, the halt, the lame and the blind"
from London (Munow, 1941, p. 6). Murrow's broadcast might have elicited sympathy from
listenen, but the thought of mothen packing a small hand bag 
- 
including a gas mask 
- 
for their
children was a rcminder that war brings serious consequenoes even for the innocent.
However, despite the sacrifice that war may entail, Briain appeared ready to embrace it.
This was demonsEated on September 3, 1939, when news ofBritain's declaration of war against
Germany was greeted with a "rousing cheer" (Murrow, I 94 I , p. I 8). Weeks later Murrow
reported that " no one minimizes the gravity of the sitrutioq but I haven't seen any sigt of
ftieht" (p. 2E).
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Such dramatic portraits of life in London were tempered by what can best be described as
the inconvenience ofwar. For example, Munow's October 15, 1939 broadcast alloned listeners
the opportunity to tour wartime london He described a city ofclosed shops and boarded up
windows, of axicabs with firc pumps attaclrcd to thcm, and of *house for lease or sale" signs
(Murrow, 1941,p.32). Though the scene might not be pleasang it rryzs sill one of ranquility.
Christianiw
Britain To-Dav. The most bpical r€sponse to isolationist claims that the *dre
irreconcilable contast behpeen the way ofthe sword and the way ofthe cross" (Page,1939, p. 7)
mandated thd the U.S. stay out ofthe war can be seen in'"Ttre English Chrisfinas" (1939).
While the article focused on the traditions of Christmas, inclding family, fellou,ship, and
Christian worship, it also inferred that these are freedoms that would not be provided undet a
German regime. Though the article only infened the connection between the war and the
freedom of rcligioq it did mamgp to make at least a tentative step touards addressing the
isolationis argument white offering the loss of religious freedom as a possible consequence ofa
German victory.
Civilization
Both 'Arms and the l{an" (1939) and 'Nineteen Forty" (1940) attempted to provide the
reeder with examples of the civilization that Britain was fighting for. In "Arms and the Man"
civilization nas re,preseltted by *material and social progress" (p. l) while in'Nineteen Forty"
civilization uas represenrcd by the music and arts that Britain rcfused to abandon despite its
circumstances. The readcr could infer that both models ofcivilization, each rich in values
important to American readers, could bejeopardized by a British defeat.
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In addition to depicting the civilization at stake, "Arms and the lvIan" (1939) addressed
the isolationist notion that Am€rica is safely rernoved from the hostilitics in Europe by a&nitting
that Britain had once held the same belief "War was unthiukable... the storm caught Britain
unprepared" (p. 2). The "don't make the samc mistake that we did" technique was employed
fu4uently throughout Britain's propaganda efforts in the United Stares, effectively using
Britain's own mistakes as a cautionary ale for its American audience.
Phase II: Briain Tates It and Canies On (May to December 1940)
Democracv
Britain Speals. Of all the sourpes of propaganda being considered in this sMy, none
was more forthright in addressing isolationist argumena than J.B. Priestley. In the June 15
broadcast ofBriraiz Speah Priestley firs addressed the foundations of British democracy.
Having done so, he began to address systematically key argumenb against U.S. interventionism.
Priestley began with same cautionary apprroach noted in "Arms and the lvIan" (1939) in the
previous phase. 'We've made our usual mistakes, we've been too complacen! we've
underestimated the orcrmous preparation and ruthlessness of the enerny'' (Priestley, l%0, p. 3l).
Priestley (1940) wamed that Hitler cannot be stopped *by holding a meeting and passing
a rcsolution salng that you don't approve of him" (1940, p. 3l). Moreover, he cautiorrcd that the
threat of Nazism was as real to the United States as to any ofthe European coun&ies: "Hitler has
no interest in America, eh? Then why all the elaborae netrvork of espionage in the United
States? The Nazis don't spend money and take time and trouble on something in which ttry arc
not interested... " (p. 33).
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Elsewhere, Priestley (1940) provided listeners with a less direct view ofthe liberties that
could be lost ifBritain is defeued. Focusing upon German propagand4 or *comic fairy tales'
(p. 100), Priestley provided listeners with sbarp contrasE between tle well informed citizenry of
the democracies and those living under Hitler's lies. In drawing the distinaion between
England, a country in which everyone "is perfectly free to any broadcasting station he chooses"
or read any newspaper they chose, and a Germany in which one is teated like 'h credulous
child" (p. 100), Priestley offercd his listeners with a subtle example ofthe liberties that are at
stake.
Strenqth and Courase.
Britain To-Dav. Both "The Will to victory" (1940) and " The Battle of London" (l9,l0)
offered readers further examples of Briton's willingness and determination to fight for their
counry. *The Will to Victory" centered on the irrepressible British "morale facror" (p. 2) that
would overcome Germany's *immediae advantage in land and air force that might posibly
enable her to deal a deadly blow to Britain's securiry" (p. 3).
Similarly, "The Battle of tondon" ( I 940) sought to demonstrate the strength of Britons
by contrasting it with the weaknesses of a * daermined and ruthless" Germany (p. 2). Both
articles appeared to make a concerted effort to emphasize that, while Britons are willing to
sacrifice they have had few sacrifices to make. In those instanccs in wtrich "ordinary citizens"
(p. l) have faced material losses, they simply carried on. For example, *Ifhis house is deshoyed
by a bomb &opped at random in th darlq he will sleep elsewhere tomonow, and pursue his
normal activities" (p. l).
Each ofthese articles addressed the isolationist claim that Britain is lacking in the ability
and will to see the uar through to victory @rumback, l94l; cole, 1953, l9z0; page, 1939;
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Stenehjem, 1976). It is interesting to note that while seriousness ofwar was addresse4 it was
also downplayed. Most would imagine having their housc destroyed by a bomb to be a
devastating evenf yetrn Britain To-Day it was dalt with characteristic British understatement
(Cull,1995).
E<lward R. Munow. One might suspea thst thst the image of Brions simply
wiping offthe dust and carrying on with their regular activities to bc a wild exaggeration or
distortion of events offered merely to reassure Americans of the Britain's ability to persevere.
However, the trusted American correspondent, Edward R Murrow, verified the perspoctive
offered in Britain T*Day.
Prior to the start of the Blidaieg the fall of France markcd England's greatest challenge
to that point ofthe war. On June l7,lg4l,Murrow (1941) reported ofan England that stood
alone. Listeners wcrc told that France's decision to cease hostilities would *not in any way
affect the British determination to carry on the war alone and to the end" (p. 129).
This detennination remained intact wen during the merciless bombing of the BliE.
Despite continued bombing, Munow (1941) reported that those "who called this a 'people's war'
were probably more right. .. I've seen some horrible sights in this city during these days and
nights, but not once have I heard man woman or child suggest that Britain throw in her hand" (p.
r6l).
Despite the facl thst a "rouine night" (Murrow, 1941, p. l7l) consisted of intermittent
bombing from nine o'clock at night until dawq Munow ofrered praise of the spirit of
Londoncrs. According to Murroq ifthe purpose ofthe Gennan attack uas to "stike terror to
the hearts ofthe Britishen, then the bombs have bean wasted" (p. 175).
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Murrow confirmed that the determination of the British people to see the war through to
completiorL but he also brought the horror ofwar into sharper focus. Isolationist claims of
British weakness might be counterd but the argument that U.S. involvement in the war on any
level would 'tesult in terrible loss of life and destruction ofprroperty" (Page, 1939, p. 7) was
reinforced.
Britain Speak. Priestley's May 30, 1940, broadcast stressed the calm in England.
Despite rumors to the contsary, he informed listeners that "werybody's as cool as a cucumber"
(p. I ) and that he had seen more'tnore fiss and orcitement" (p.l) trying to collect his luggage at
the airport. However, he acknowledged that the ternper of'the ordinary easy-going English
people is rising" (pp. 55). Listeners were informed that any attempt at invasion would only
increase the resolve of the British people.
Priestley (1940) also addressed isolationist claims that the war was srictly a European
affair. The Germans will either'be destoyed or they will dominale the world" (1940, p. 3).
Unlike previous uan, Priestley contended that this one was not a battle between certain nations,
but rathcr "a despera@ battle in which the frrnre of the whole world is involved" (p. 4). This
battle was benueen *trvo ways of life" (p. 4) and the fight to allow men woman and chil&en to
"lead a tull and happy life" (p. 4).
Priestley's (1940) argument against the isolationist beliefthat an ocean will protect
America was furthered as he acknowledged the flawed thinking of his ovm countrymen that had
impeded p,reparation for the war: "You can't persuade a lot ofEnglish that tlrey don't live on a
magic island. They believe, these nice comfortable stupid folk, that disasters and tragedies, fire
and slaughter, teachery and invasion are things that only happen overseas to tlrose strange
excitable beings called 'foreigners'" (p. 5).
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A similar approach can be seen in the June 24, I940, brosdcast of Britain Speaks.
Priestley atternpted to demonstrate that isolationists are ernpowering Nazism, which he
contended relied upon the tolerance of democracies to provide it with the opportr.rnity to spread.
He then pointedly added that Gomany was relying on the belief that they "can't underestimate
the stupidity ofthe world" (p. 47).
The broadcas strressed the enormity of what is at stake in this war as Priestlcy ( I %0)
claimed that "we may be lost and civilization lost with us " (p. 46). With civilization at stake,
Priestly contended it was not rmreasonable for Britain to ask 'hot for merl bd wery possible
kind ofoffensive and defensive weapon" (p. 46). It is significant though not wholly truthful,
that Priestley confirmed that Britain was not seeking Amcrican manporver. While full U.S.
participation in the war effort was slways Britain's grear unspoken goal (Cull, 1995),
acknowledging this could have reversed any success Britain's efforts in the U.S. had had.
Insrcad, Priestley gave his audience with a rationale for providing aid while minimizing concerns
that Britain sought to &aw its audience into the war.
Christianitv
Britain Sgxks. The August 5, 1940, broadcast of Brilain Speaks combined the themes of
civilization and Chdstianity as Priestley replied to a letter from a lisEner in Glens Falls, New
York. The broadcast provided Priestley with an opportunity to dircctly address isolationist
concems and also offercd an excellent illustration ofthe techniques Priestley employed
throughout his broadcasts.
Priesfley's (1940) response to the letter, wtrich will be further discussed in the following
sectioq ad&ess€d the beliefofboth the tetter's author and isolationists, that American
involvement in the uar uould prove detimental to the spfuitual rvell being of America. priestley
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contended the opposite, that'pretended indifference to one ofthe profoundest conflicts in the
history of man" (p. 147) would only deprive America of the very spiritrulity it was founded
upon.
The consequences of isolationism, according to Priestley ( I %0), posed a serious threat to
the American way. "I don't want to see American becoming Byzantium, but behaving like
America, where mcn went to become free and eqrnl where men went to become ftee and equal,
where democracy and liberty, for which we arc fighting found is gre* home" (p. la8).
Civilization
Britain Speals. As previously mentiond Priestlcy's August 5, 1940, brcadcast, in
which he replied to a letter from a lisrcner in Glens Falls, New Yorh combined the themes of
Christianity and civilization. This psrticular broadcsst provided an exc€llent capsulation ofhis
approaches to addressing the competing isolationist story throughout his broadcasts.
Priestley's (1940) reply to the listena began wittr a rcfutation of tlp claim that the war
was a European afrair. Priestley called this line of thinking'out-ofdate and dangerous' (p. 143)
and argued that the uar apinst Nazism involves "the old family homestead of the whole wide
world" (p. 143). To illustate his point, Priestley connecrcd the 1929 Wall Steet crash to the
Nazi rise to power. The example provided the listener with a pouarful illustration of thc
intcrconnectcdness of global events.
As he had done in the past, Priestley (l%0) informed lisenen tha! even if they uiere not
interested in European affairs' Germany was interested in the United States and had an extensive
"nctwork of Nazi intigue and espionage" exterding into $e united sates. ..The facts', suggest
that 'this is a plan for world domimtion or nothing', (p. 145).
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The portrait Priestley (1940) provided his listeners showed a battle for the civilization
that both Britain and the U.S. r€asued. It nas this civilization tha was threarcned by the
"vehemence" of the Germans, the battle to ensure that "something good and not something wil"
comes from the war (p. l42).
While this b,roadcast ernbodied many of Priestley's responses to American isolationists, it
also provided one atypical response. American isolationists had frequently cited Britain's
outstarding war debts from the First World War, along with the perception that America had
fought the war for Brit'in. Priestley (1940) replied by informing listeners that both nations werc
left with a mass of unpaid uar debts and that Briain sufferred an eveo more significant loss in the
form of *one million dead" (1940,p. 142) rrarly three times that of American losses (Reynolds,
1983). Priestley's reply was the only such of its kind within the materials gathered for this sMy.
Class and Equalitv
Britain Soeaks. As noted in Chaper 5, Briain most frequently responded to criticism of
class inequality by acknowledging its presence and suggesting that it was actively seeking
methods to conect the situation. This approach was demonstrated in a July 1940 broadcast of
Britain Speaks. Priestley (1940) acknowledged that "divisions between classes" (p. 127)had
always been "England's weakness" (p. 127). However, the listener was informed that that the
war was causing these divisions to be "rubbed out" (p.127). Britons of all classes were finding
that a "sense of community uas being deeply felt" (p. 1 26) as they rallied togetller to fight for
democracy and liberty.
This broadcast and othen like it, werc sipificant for two reasons. First, the
acknowledgment of class division provided Briain with the opportunity to appear credible.
while isolationists had criticized Britain's rigid class systern @rumbaclq l94l;cole, 1953),
88
Hahcrington: The Pcople's Wu
these claims were largely peripheral. Subsequantly Britain likely did more good than harm by
confessing the class disparity. Secon4 listeners we able to soe tha there could be positive
oorBequences associated with the war.
Phase III: The Assumed Alliance (January to December l%l)
Democracv
Britain To-Dav. President Fraoklin Roosevelt's January l94l public pledge of assistance
to Briain (Cull, 1995; Coodwin, 1994) uas greeted with a number of changes in British
propaganda. While Briain uas sill fighting to preserve dunocracy and the liberties and
freedoms it had produced, we see that the new alliarrce had stengthened democracy ("The New
Year," I 94 I ). This new optimism set the standard for British propaganda throughout I 94 I .
However, "The New Year" (1941) suggested that danocracy had been empowered by the
new alliance which served to reinforce the notion that &mocracy was at stake and must be
protectcd. America might have been "non-belligerent but potent in sympathy and capacity to
give material ai(" (p. I ), but Britain was the implicit defender of a democracy under attack.
The "spea.rlread of resistance"(*Britain and America"" 1941, p. l) was also able to be
more forthright in its requess for aid from the United States. Roosevelt's pledge of aid and
words of praise for Briain's fight provided Britain with the ability to present itself openly as the
protector of the American rmy. According to "Britain and America ' ( l94l ) 'the British cause is
their euse, the British people may be countcd on to susain it worthily" (p. l). Such claims, that
suggested Britain uas Feporcd to defend American ifterests and values, sought counter claims
that Britain uafted the U.S. to fight the war on their behalf
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Just as was seen in Britain's dcpiction of the war as a mea$t to remedy class disparity,
the war also provided for a new union. Additionally, the cumulative effect ofBritain figlting on
behalf of 'the American cause" ('tsritain aod America" 1941, p. l) proved an effective counter
for the claims that America had fought for the berefit of Briain in the First World War
(Brumbach I94l; Cole, 1953,1974; Stenehjen, 1976).
*Freedom from Want" (l%1) drew from Presideft Fra*lin Roosevelt's January l94l
"Four Freedoms" speech in which the President looked toward a world bound by four essentials
human freedorns: freedom of speech freedom from nlant freedorn from fear, and fi,eedom of
worship (Goodwin, 1994). The article proposed that, with its newly gaincd U.S. backing, Britain
would be able to bring Rooscvelt's vision to fruition by helping those who "exist in da*ness
under Nazi rule" (p. 2) to be freed.
Britain Speaks. Britain Speaks also celeb,rated the rrw alliance ofthe democracies.
Priestley's June 4, I94I broadcast centered on the positive consequences the new union would
bring. Quoting Wifliam Blake, Priestley suggested that " we may yet... build a Heaven in Hell's
despite."
Bulletins from Britain. *We Don't Call This Britain's Wa/'(Casey, l%l) provided
American readen with the penpective of the Austalian Minister to thc United Sates. While the
article onphasized Australia's commitnent to dernocracy and confirmed that donocracy is what
is being fought for, it also covered several other worthwhile points.
Firsl, Casey ( I 94 I ) informed readen that, as a commonwealtll Australia was under no
obligation to Britain in war or pea.ce. Ausfralia had chorcn to fight with Britain and the Allies
because it recogrized the * world-widc natue of Germarry's ambitioms" (p. 5). This is especially
sigttificant givea that Australia was *most remote in the world from geat centers of population"
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(p. 5). These facts clearly sup,ported Briain's contentions that no one, including the United
States, was safe from German attack or invssion. The piece made an additioml, though subtle
point. The presence of the Austalian army, as well as those of other commonwealths, hclped to
mitigate concerns that Britain u/as hoping to have the United States fight the war for them
(Brumbach l94l; Cole, 1953; Page, 1939).
Streneth and Couraee.
Bulletins from Britain. Throughout this phase the tleme ofstength and couragc was
offered in a less dramatic fashion than previously seen. Britons now appea.red to be facing a
series of inconveniences that likely appea.red more palaable to American audiences. For
example, "The British Rationing System Strict, but FaiI" (Evans, I 94 I ) provided readers with an
account of food rationing in Britain by the U.S. Administrator ofthe Agricultural Adjusrnent
Administration The author reported that 'being us€d to the variey of an American diet I was
hungry all the time" (Evans, 1941, p. 4) suggesting the sacrifice ofBritons. One farmer, he said,
had 200 dairy con s that he milked each day. However, the farmer himself rarely had a drop of
milk as it was reserved for the women and children. Such pieces allowed the British to be seen
in a sympathetic light while simultaneously prcsenting their sacrifices as manageable.
The use of rationing was one oftwo methods used in Bulletins from Britaiz to convey the
strength and courage ofBritons to Americans. The second was to present s:lcrifice in an
adventurous or heroic fashion. This uas well illustrafed in "Courage Has Many Colours" (1941)
a semi-regular cohtrn n Bulletirc from Britain Mumenting the "heroes and heroircs" (p. 5) of
the war effort. Readers heard ofa rcam of dernolition experts who died while bravely defising
bombs and British soldiers in Libya celebrating the capture of a German with a bottle of
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champagne. The briefanecdotes did not deny the sevene consequences ofwar, but dwelled upon
the adventurous and heroic aspocts instead ofthe true sacrifice.
Christianitv
Britain To-Dav. Barker's ( l94l) "The Progress of British Danocracy" combined the
themes ofChristianity and democracy. Barker's assertion that'it was by uray ofreligion, of
religious experience that the English people came to the practice of... democracy" efrectively
refuted the isolationist argument that war would violaE the tenes of Christianity. If it was to be
believed that Britain is fighting to preserve a dem@racy created through the religious
experience, religion must also be protected by the war effort.
This concept was elaborated upon by Barker who stnessed the religious freedom that has
been aftorded to democratic nations. Implicit in Barker's messagp was the notion that the
religious freedom protected by democracy would be lost ifdemocracy were to perish. The reader
who valued religious freedom uras led to the conclusion that it can only be protected by
preserving democracy.
Bulletins from Britain. "Put an End to This Tenorism Now!" (Dovmey, l94l ) found the
Archbishop of Liverpool addressing the isolationist claim that assistance to, or participation in,
the war effort would be detrimental to the spiritul life of Americans. Downcy's article
emphasized the religious pemecution perpefarcd by the Nazis demonstrating that Christianity, or
any form or spirituality, would be threatened by a Nazi victory.
Downey's approach was repearcd in numerous othet ptef,f,)s in Bulletins from Britain,
including "The Cross Witl Disappear" that reports on "the anti4hristian movement in Germury"
(1941). The article cited German pamphlets that claimed the cross woutd be replaced by the
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swastika and the *public will be forbid&n to read the Bible or any books dealing with the
Christian faith" (1941). The recunences of pieces like this helped to depict the urar as a uar for
Christianity and religious freedom.
Civilization
Britain To-Dav. The positive consequences ofwar were offered again in "The Remaking
of Britaia'( 1941). The reader was informed that German bombs were crdircd with
accomplishing the demolition of more condemned buildings than social rcformers had been able
to accomplish. This destnrction, the reader was told, would provide an impetus for the creation
ofnew and better housing for the peoPle of London. While the possible good of German
bombings appears ludicrous, the article presented the rea&r with a vision of a poshwar world
that featured better tansportation, health care and "amenities of life" ("The Remaking of
BritairL" 1941, p. 3).
Britain Speak. In the Sepernber I l, l94l brcEldcast of Britain Spearts Priestley focused
on the destuction caused by the Nazis. This broadcast was typical ofPriestley's approach to
continue to rernind his audience Germany's attempb to destoy'1he intellectual and cultural life"
ofall they encounter. This is not to say that Pricstley ignored the Anglo'American alliance that
he believed has been brougfut "by the people, for thc people" (hiestley, 1941, September I l) but
he continued to caution that barbarism has been "bmught nearer to civilization" @riestley, 1941,
Sepember I l). The broadcast and others like it tied to create a balance benileen opimism and
caution showing tha! white the Anglo-American alliance was cause for hope, the Nazi tk€at
remained real.
Class and Eoualiw
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Britain Speak. Equality continued to be presented as a value that Britain was striving to
achieve and one that was being well sewed by the war. As was seen in the prcvious phase,
Briain offered the waf, as a means ofbringing about social refonn. On a number ofoccasions,
including his Janrwy 26,1941, broadcast, Priestley pointed to commrmal living as a means of
bringing together Britons ofdifferent classes and backgrounds under one roof The bigges
beneficiary ofthese new living arrangements were "our firture citizens," the children who are
living free ofclass ideologies.
Priestley's presentntion of life in hostels was sigrificant for several reasons. First, as I
have already discussed it suggested that war can bring about positive social reform. Secon4 ir
placed the decidedly negative matter ofdisplaced families into a positive light. Priestley's
depiction of the mothen and childrcn living in hostels was one of people living and working
together in harmony and "carrying on the fight for the right ofthe ordinary decent man and
woman everywhere to a full and satis$ing life" (Priestley, 1941, January 26). Subsequently,
another of war's honors, the loss ofone's home and the accompanying upheaval was not denied,
but presented in a less honifring manner.
Bulletins from Briain. H.G. Wells' "A Common Brotherhood is Being Realized" (1941)
reflected the way in which the war was helping to alleviate class divisions in England, replacing
it with a new "social orde/' (p. 3). According to Wells, the British were brought together as one
by the war, realizing that "we arc all going to be poor together or we are all going to be rich
together" (p. 3).
wells' article confirmed the idea that rcaders were presented with in nunerous other
articles that sought to demonffare the positive changes taking place in England as a result of the
war. A new sense of community had found Britons of all classe s joining together for the
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common good. Britom werc reaping the fortune and sharing the misfortune of the war equally
and preparing for a post-war period dominated by a'tlassless society" (Wells, l9al, p.3).
Summary
Throughout the fint and second phases ofBritish prropagand4 Briain sought to establish
what could happen if the Unihd Sates failed to provide aid to the uar effort. As uas noted in
chaper 5, dernocracy served as the transcendert issue in British propaganda; accordingly the
tkeat to democracy appea$ to receive the most attention The focus on democracy provided a
counter to isolationist claims that American denrocracy would be threatened by aid to or
participationinthewar(Brumback, l94l;Cole, 1953,1974:Page, 1939;Sargent l94l;
Stenehjem, 1976).
Britain also sought, throughout all three phases, to counter American isolationist claims
that the U.S. was safe from the events in Eurcpe and, as such, should remain isolated from thern
(Brumback, l94l; Cole, 1953,1974;Kennedy, 1999;Page, t939; Sargent, l94l: Stenehjem,
1976). Britain's efforts centered upon two approachcs. First, Britain actnowledged its own
flawed thinking in this regard, danonstrating how their beliefthat a body of water could keep
them out ofEuropean affain impeded their nrar effort. Socon4 British propaganda focused upon
the global ambitions ofHitler and the Nazi forces.
British propaganda throughout 1939 to l94t prcsented a rcalistic depiction ofttp dire
consequences of war, but also attempted to counter these consequences so as not to further
isolate their U.S. audiences. Agaiq several approaches figured prominently. First, Britain
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attempted to demonshat€ that the loss of Iife and personal property was outweighed by the loss
ofdemocracy, and, indee4 civilization as it was known.
Secon4 Britain atempt€d to illustrate the positive results of war. War was shown to have
provided Britain with social rcform and an erosion ofclass divisions. Britons had bccome a
community working toward I betkr future. These ideals would likely have been appealing to an
America that had suffered through one of its worst economic crises ever (Goodwin, 194).
By the third phase, British propaganda focused more heavily upon these positive
consequences. In addition to accentuating the positive, Briain attempted to show the negative
consequences of war as being more inconvenient than devastating. Britons were faced with
rationing, which, though bothersome was certainly tolerable. Audiences were also shown that
war, even with it hardships, could be adventurous, allowing ordinary men and women to become
heroes.
Ultimately, British propaganda provided Americans with cause to beliwe that they were
not safely isolated from the events in Europe, no mat&r how hard tlrey might have tried to be.
Americans were shown that their aid and assistance could produce positive results that outweigh
even the more serious consequenoes ofwar.
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Chapter MI: Conclusions
Results
This study focused on the persussive powers of British propaganda in the United Sates
betwean the yean of 1939 and 1941. This uas accomplished by examining pamphlets, serialized
publications, radio scrips and transcripts for the presence of identification as defincd by Burke
(1969) and their ability to meet the standards of Fisher's (1989) the logic of good reasons. In
addition to demonstrating that these materials made extensive use of identification and could
meet the standards ofthe logic ofgood reasons, several other intercsting points are revealed
through the application ofthese theories.
First this study demonstrated considerable conrpction between Burke's (1969) concept
of identification and Fisher's (1989) logic of good reas)ns. America was only able to identi&
with Britain because Britain provided its U.S. audience with values consistent with its oum.
Britain's repeated presentation of shared values, beliefs, and ideals allowed Americans to be
more receptive of Britain's attempts to counter isolationist arguments against interventionism.
This study also revealed three distinct phases ofBritish propagianda in the U.S. between
1939 and 1941. In each of these phases Britain relied upon slightly different persuasive
approaches to meet its needs. Britain's persuasive efforts in the first phase began cautiously but
would soon become more aggressive in both tone and inrcntion during the drama of tlrc Battle of
Britain and the Blitz. The mos marked change took place during the third phase following
Roosevelt's January l94l ptrblic pledge ofassistance to Briain. Throughout that period British
propaganda attempted to promote ttrc fledgling Anglo-American alliance while it simultaneously
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sought to present the war in a manner that could counter the serious consequenc€s that could
accompany U.S. involvement.
Finally, this study revealed that Britain did in fact rely upon a "strategy of truth" (Brewer,
1997, p. 4) in its campaign ogins U.S. neutality. This approach uas markedly diferent than
British propaganda in the U.S. during the First World War. Rather than fabricating arocities
(Taylor, 1990) focused instead on the way in which Germany's actions differed from the sharcd
values, beliefs and ideals of Americans and Britons.
Strenqth and Limitstiotrs
This study examined radio transcripts and scdpts, pomphlets and serialized publications.
While these materials have been recogrized as playing a sigrificant role in the British campaign
againstAmericanneutrality(Brcwer, 1997; Cull, 1993, 1995; Graves, l94l; Rhodcs, 1976;
Taylor, 1990), there has been a dearth of material examining the persuasive abilities of these
materials.
Additionally, this study p,rovided insight into the changes British propaganda rvent
through from one phase to the next. While previous studies (Brewer,1997; Cull, 1995) suggest
that Briain's pey5rrasivg sff61s lvsnt through stages, these studies have not provided an
explanation ofthe nature ofthese changes and the uays in which they furthered Briain's efforts
in America.
This study would have benefited from the availability ofadditional serialized
publications, panrphlets and broadcasts from the BBC North American Service. However, "afrer
the war, Britain seems to have tried to destroy evidence of is war propaganda in the United
States" (Cull, 195, p. 4). This has resulted in the destnrction of recordings and scripts and the
classification ofthe British Information Sewice's directory of British publications in the U.S.
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between 1939 and 1945 (N.J. Cull, penonal correspondenc€, November 20, 2000). In spite of
the dearth of materials, this study benefits from the inclusion of four major sources: Britain To-
Day, Bulletins from Britain, and the wrrllan records of J.B. Priestley and Edward R Murrow's
broadcasts.
Final Thoughts
The war that the United Sates entered on December 7, 1941, was one that it had seen
almost entirely through British eyes. Given the fact that the U.S. did not enrcr the war until afrer
Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany had declarcd war, it would be easy to negate
Britain's efforts to lead America from isolationism to inErveftionism. However, despite the fact
that it would be impossible to quantifo the effects of Britain's efforts in the U.S., British
propaganda hclped to bring about a marked transformation in American attitudcs and opinions
(Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995).
British propaganda in the United States between 1939 and l94l must be understood as a
cumulative process. At each stage ofthe process British propagandisB would achieve
"considerable success" (Cull, 195, p. l9E). First, in 1939, Briain would benefit from a revision
in the Neutrality Acts. By 1940 Roosevelt had sigred an executive order approving the
destroyers-for-bases deal which rms followed by the passage of the lendlease bill in 1941.
While Britain clearly benefited from Franklin Roosevelt's pro-interventionist stance, Cull ( 195)
argues that the importance of British propaganda cannot be underestimated in its ability to h€lp
foster the public opinion ttut allowed Roosevelt to provide this aid. Given the tremendous
isolationist opposition to foreign aid" "no component ofsecuring that aid 
- 
let alone British
propoganda 
- 
can be dismised" (Cull, 1995, p. 201).
By the late summer of l94l comic book heroes like Captain lvlarvel and Captain America
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Were battling Nazis and the best selling book in the nation dealt with the war from a British
perspective (Cull, 1995). By the time America entered the war, American popular culture had
tumed away from isolationism and beean embracing interventionism (Brewer, 1997; Cull, 1995).
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